


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30 JANUARY 1991



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-003

CONTENTS

30 January 1991

AFRICA

NIGERIA

- Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Urged at UN Conference [Dakar PANA 15 Jan] 1

CHINA

- Article Reviews Arms Reduction in Europe [SHIJIE ZHISHI No 24, 16 Dec] 2
 'Yearender' on Conventional Disarmament in Europe [RENMIN RIBAO 31 Dec] 3
 Spokesman Denies Nuclear Warheads Sent to Saudis [XINHUA 14 Jan] 5
 UN Conference on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Ends [XINHUA 18 Jan] 5

EAST ASIA

INDONESIA

- Foreign Minister Views UN Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Conference [ANTARA 22 Jan] 6

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

- Envoy's Statement to UN Nuclear Test Ban Conference [BTA 15 Jan] 7

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Envoy Addresses UN Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Conference [CTK 11 Jan] 7
 Last Soviet Air Fighter Squadron Leaves [CTK 21 Jan] 7
 Soviet Withdrawal From Germany Via CSFR Discussed 7
 Transport Ministry Official Comments [CTK 22 Jan] 7
 Commission Opposed [Prague Radio 22 Jan] 8

HUNGARY

- Soviet Troops Withdrawing 'According to Schedule' [MTI 14 Jan] 8

POLAND

- Arms Reductions, Restructuring Under CFE Detailed [PAP 8 Jan] 8
 Soviet Troop Deployment in Country Viewed [PAP 9 Jan] 8
 Army To Reduce Troop Strength Over 5-7 Years [PAP 9 Jan] 9
 Preparations Under Way for Soviet Troop Transit [PAP 10 Jan] 9
 Spokesman Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal Timetable [PAP 11 Jan] 9
 No USSR Military Traffic Reportedly Authorized [Warsaw Radio 11 Jan] 9
 Soviet Troop Talks Show 'No Breakthrough' [PAP 11 Jan] 10
 Spokesman Claims Progress in Troop Pullout Talks
 [M. Wagrowska; RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Jan] 10
 Soviet Army's Dubynin Cited on Troop Withdrawal [PAP 16 Jan] 11
 Foreign Minister Calls Fears Over Soviet Pullout 'Unfounded'
 [K. Skubiszewski; ZYCIE WARSZAWY 17 Jan] 11
 Sejm Committee Chairman Confident on Soviet Troop Pullout
 [B. Geremek; GAZETA WYBORCZA 21 Jan] 12
 Foreign Minister: 'No Impasse' on Soviet Troop Withdrawal [PAP 24 Jan] 13

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Foreign Minister Claims Iraq Financed Condor Research [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS 22 Jan] 14

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

ALGERIA

National Defense Minister Discusses Disarmament [EL MOUDJAHID 19 Nov] 15

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Arbatov Article on Arms Reductions Criticized [V. Korobushin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Jan] 17
Fifth Anniversary of Gorbachev Plan for Nuclear-Free World Marked 18
Petrovskiy Views Progress [PRAVDA 15 Jan] 18
'Proper Perspective' Seen [B. Pyadyshev; PRAVDA 12 Jan] 20
Plan Said 'Working Successfully' [V. Chernyshev; TASS 14 Jan] 22
'Nuclear Angle' of Soviet Union's Breakup Considered [Ye. Shashkov; PRAVDA 21 Jan] 23
UN Experts Discuss Conventional Arms Sales [Ye. Menkes; TASS 22 Jan] 24

START TALKS

U.S. ALCM Development Criticized [Yu. Alekseyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Jan] 24
U.S. Motives for Summit Postponement Viewed 25
CFE, START Linkage Scored [V. Chernyshev; TASS 8 Jan] 25
START Seen Linked to CFE Implementation [M. Yusin; IZVESTIYA 9 Jan] 26
Churkin Announces Start of Treaty 'Elaboration' [TASS 19 Jan] 26
Obukhov Optimistic on Prompt Treaty Completion [A. Fedychin; TASS 21 Jan] 26

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Alternative Uses for Krasnoyarsk Site Suggested [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 15 Jan] 27

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shevardnadze Said To Quit Over CFE Tank Dispute
[A. Ignatov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Jan] 28
Reports on Arms Movement Seen as 'Sensationalism'
[V. Manilov, V. Kuklev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Jan] 29
Chervov on Soviet Tank Redeployment Behind Urals [Bratislava VEREJNOST 8 Jan] 32
Pros, Cons of CFE Treaty Debated [V. Shkoda, V. Litov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 9 Jan] 33
Chervov Defends Soviet Observance of CFE Treaty [N. Chervov; IAN PRESS RELEASE 9 Jan] 36
Soviet, FRG Legislators View Troop Withdrawal [N. Kaintsev; TASS 14 Jan] 37
Soviet Official on Obstacles to Troop Withdrawals [Berlin ADN 15 Jan] 38
Last Air Force Regiment Leaves Czechoslovakia [A. Shapovalov; TASS 21 Jan] 38
First 93 Tanks Shipped From Germany 21 Jan [M. Voronenkov; TASS 22 Jan] 38

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Batsanov Comments on Opening of Conference Session [TASS 22 Jan] 38

NUCLEAR TESTING

Continued Controversy Over Semipalatinsk Operations 39
Rumor of Shift to Uzbekistan Denied [SOYUZ No 49, Dec] 39
Discussion in Kazakhstan Rayon Soviet [S. Mataver; SOYUZ No 50, Dec] 39
UN Conference Considers Test Ban Treaty Changes 41

Perez de Cuellar Remarks Reported	[Ye. Menkes; TASS 8 Jan]	41
Conference Adds 'Pressure' on U.S.	[A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA 9 Jan]	41
U.S. Attitude Criticized	[V. Chernyshev; TASS 9 Jan]	42
Gorbachev Greets Conference	[PRAVDA 9 Jan]	42
Total Ban Not Adopted	[Moscow Radio 19 Jan]	42
Parliamentarians Urge Total Ban on Nuclear Tests	[Ye. Menkes; TASS 9 Jan]	43
TASS Reports UN Report on Nuclear Test Ban	[M. Kochetkov; TASS 10 Jan]	43
Belousov Announces Nuclear Test Moratorium	[B. Zverev; TASS 12 Jan]	44

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Gosplan Head on Cost of CW Elimination	[Yu. Maslyukov; Moscow Radio 9 Jan]	44
--	-------------------------------------	----

WEST EUROPE

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EDU Suggests Middle East Disarmament Conference	[Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG 24 Jan]	45
---	--------------------------------	----

DENMARK

Ramifications of CFE Agreement for Army Seen	[N.E. Boesgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 27 Nov]	45
--	---	----

FINLAND

Nordic States Urge USSR To Improve Nuclear Test Safety	[HELSINGIN SANOMAT 5 Jan]	46
--	---------------------------	----

FRANCE

Greenpeace Asks France To Join Test Ban Talks	[Hong Kong AFP 6 Jan]	47
---	-----------------------	----

GERMANY

NATO Revising Political, Nuclear Strategies	[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 5 Dec]	47
Companies Said To Sell Iraq Poison Gas Casings	[DER SPIEGEL 21 Jan]	49
Soviet Withdrawal Starts at Port of Rostock	[ADN 21 Jan]	49

NORWAY

Defense Minister Criticizes Soviet CFE Data		49
Calls Information 'Misleading'	[O.T. Storvik; AFTENPOSTEN 8 Jan]	49
Notes 'Problems' in Kola Region	[J.J. Holst; ARBEIDERBLADET 10 Jan]	50

SWEDEN

Radioactivity After Novaya Zemlya Test	[B. Idas; Oslo AFTENPOSTEN 23 Nov]	51
--	------------------------------------	----

SWITZERLAND

State of Nonproliferation Controls Assessed	[F. Mueller; DIE WELTWOCHTE 8 Nov]	51
---	------------------------------------	----

NIGERIA

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Urged at UN Conference

*AB1501132091 Dakar PANA in English 0942 GMT
15 Jan 91*

[Text] New York, 15 January (NAN/PANA)—Nigeria has called for a comprehensive test ban treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in all environments. The West African nation's position was presented at the United Nations in New York by Bariyu Adeyemi, deputy director-general of the international organisations directorate in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was speaking at the on-going amendment conference of the states parties to the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The conference, which ends Friday, has been convened to utilise the provisions of the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Adeyemi said Nigeria's support for such a total ban stems from the country's previous experience, having been seriously affected by the 1960 French atmospheric

test in the Sahara, a situation that forced the country to sever diplomatic relations with France.

He added that apartheid South Africa's frustration of the regional efforts to make Africa a nuclear weapon-free zone only strengthened Nigeria's support for such a ban.

The deputy director-general pointed out that underground testing of nuclear weapons had resulted to atmospheric leakage of radioactive material, causing cancer and leukaemia in people living ('in those) sites. He also said that it was a paradox that the countries who produce such weapons urge other states to refrain from developing the same weapons which they themselves seemed to consider indispensable.

Adeyemi accused the nuclear weapons states of having failed in their obligation to continue negotiations with a view to achieving a solution to the problem of all underground nuclear weapons tests. [no opening quotation marks as received] He stated that a comprehensive test ban would end the discriminatory nature of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, help prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation. It would also prevent the emergence of new, third generation nuclear weapons and promote a new world order based on common security and abandonment of threat to force.

Article Reviews Arms Reduction in Europe

HK1301025091 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 24, 16 Dec 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Mou Changlin (3664 7022 2651): "Another Breakthrough in Arms Reduction: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] Following the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF], another breakthrough was made in arms reduction. At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] summit on 19 November, 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries officially signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] (also called the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Weapons in Europe). According to the treaty, the conventional weapons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be reduced by large quantities, thus greatly reducing the probability of both sides' starting sudden attacks in Europe. This is the first agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons between the two sides since the Second World War.

The Content

The treaty sets strict limitations on the conventional weapons of the two alliances and Germany, and makes detailed specifications for the inspection of the reduction and destruction of conventional weapons.

Maximum Limits for Five Types of Heavy Weapons for the Two Alliances Each side can retain 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 combat helicopters in the entire reduction area from the Atlantic to the Urals. In addition, both sides announced by means of a declaration that they will retain 430 land-based naval combat aircraft.

Maximum Limits for Different Zones The treaty divides the entire reduction area into four zones—namely, the central Europe zone (which includes Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg); central Europe enlarged zone (which includes the central Europe zone, Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, and the four military regions of the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev); the Atlantic-Urals zone (which includes the central Europe enlarged zone, Spain, Portugal, and the two military regions of Moscow and Volga-Urals); and the flank zone (which includes Romania, Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Greece, Turkey, and the four Soviet military regions of Odessa, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Leningrad). The numbers of tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces of both sides are strictly limited (see table).

Maximum Limits for Individual Countries To prevent the conventional strength of any country from becoming excessively strong, the treaty stipulates that the numbers of conventional weapons possessed by any one country within in the two alliances must not exceed two-thirds of its own alliance (see table).

Weapons Limits for Germany Besides setting limits for the United States and the Soviet Union, the treaty also makes specifications for Germany's conventional weapons.

Inspection The treaty establishes a strict inspection system, which includes information exchange, on-the-spot inspections, and query inspection. Both sides will be inspected nearly 100 times.

Destruction of Reduced Weapons The treaty takes effect 10 days after approval, and from then on both sides will have to destroy the all the reduced weapons by three stages within 40 months. Twenty-five percent of them will have to be destroyed in the first year, and 60 percent in the second.

The Influence

The CFE talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are the continuation of the central European disarmament [MBFR—Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction] talks started in October 1973. The central European disarmament talks lasted 15 years, during which 46 rounds of talks were held, but they produced no satisfactory results. The CFE talks officially began on 9 March last year. After seven rounds of talks in less than two years, remarkable progress was made. The treaty changes the balance of Europe's conventional forces, eliminates the tense state of confrontation between the two military alliances in central Europe, and will have a great influence on promoting the formation of a new European security structure and process of arms reduction in the world.

Changes in the Balance of Europe's Conventional Forces Will Be Unfavorable to the Soviet Union Before the treaty was signed, the ratio in the numbers of conventional weapons located by the Soviet Union in Europe compared with NATO's was two to one. After the treaty is signed, the situation will be markedly changed. In keeping with the principle of "asymmetrical reduction," the treaty reduces the Soviet Union's conventional weapons by large quantities. According to the limits specified by the treaty, the conventional weapons located by the Soviet Union in Europe should be reduced by two-thirds the number in 1988. Despite the fact that the treaty specifies that both sides can retain equal amounts of conventional weapons in Europe, since troops of East European countries do not take orders from the Soviet Union, the ratio in the number of NATO's conventional weapons compared with the Soviet Union's is three to two. No wonder, regarding the treaty, Bush said it was "drawing a new military map."

The Probability of Launching Sudden Attacks Reduced The treaty sets strict limitations for the numbers of conventional weapons located by the two alliances in various zones, thus greatly alleviating the military confrontation in central Europe. In the case of tanks, both sides have located a total of 21,246 tanks in former East Germany and West Germany, but the number of tanks within the German borders will drop below 7,000 within

three years. Therefore, the tense situation appearing in central Europe after the Second World War will also perish, and the probability that either side will use its frontline troops to launch sudden attacks will no longer exist.

Lay the Foundation for the Formation of a New European Security Structure The former European pattern was marked mainly by the confrontation between the two military alliances. Its crumbling will enable the collective security structure, whose basic framework is the CSCE, to replace the "Yalta structure." Establishing a new European security structure has become an urgent task. The signing of the treaty has promoted the convening of the CSCE. This creates favorable conditions for the formation of a new European security structure.

Promote Further Arms Reduction in Europe, and Exert an Influence on the Process of Arms Reduction Around the World At the ensuing talks after the treaty was signed, the United States and the Soviet Union proposed to further reduce their own conventional weapons in Europe to adapt themselves to the changes in Europe and to the development of their relationships. Reduction of the conventional weapons of other European countries, including Britain and France will also be put on the agenda at the talks. The level of conventional weapons in Europe will probably continue to fall. The United States and the Soviet Union also decided that as soon as the treaty is signed they will immediately begin talks on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons. If they are able to agree on the new "zero" proposal, it will not only have a great influence on Europe's military structure but also promote, to a certain extent, the process of the arms reduction around the world.

The CFE Treaty is the product of the bargaining and compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to hasten the signing of the treaty within this year, for those difficult problems over which there are many differences, both sides have either "shelved" them until the ensuing talks, or simply excluded them from the talks. For this reason, the current treaty still has many shortcomings and flaws: 1) The maximum limits for the alliances specified by the treaty still exceed the actual need, and so the threat of war has not been thoroughly eliminated. 2) The treaty only places limitations on the numbers of conventional weapons but makes no specifications regarding their quality. Both sides can make up for the decrease in numbers by continuously researching and developing sophisticated conventional weapons. 3) The treaty reduces the numbers of army and air force weapons, but sets no limitations on the navy's conventional weapons. 4) The treaty only places limitations on conventional weapons but does not include troops. This is an obvious flaw in the treaty. 5) There are many loopholes in the provisions on inspection, and both sides can always find the chance to break them.

Profile of the World's Heavy Conventional Weapons

According to latest UN estimates, in the world's stockpiles of conventional weapons, there are approximately 140,000 heavy tanks, over 35,000 combat aircraft, over 21,000 combat helicopters, over 1,000 large warships, and over 900 attack submarines. It is estimated that approximately four-fifths of the world's military expenditures is used on conventional weapons.

	Limit for each alliance	Limit for each country
Tanks [T]	20,000	13,300
Armored Combat Vehicles [ACV]	30,000	20,000
Artillery [A]	20,000	13,700
Combat Aircraft [CA]	6,800	5,150
Combat Helicopters [CH]	2,000	1,500

[Limits in Various Zones]

	Central Europe Zone	Central Europe Enlarged Zone	Atlantic-Urals Zone	Flank Zone
T	15,000	20,600	23,600	9,400
ACV	22,500	38,520	42,800	11,800
A	10,000	18,200	22,000	12,000
CA	—	—	—	—
CH	—	—	—	—

'Yearender' on Conventional Disarmament in Europe

HK0801055791 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
31 Dec 90 p 7

["Yearender" by Hu Yumin (5170 6276 7036): "A Year in Which Breakthrough Has Been Made in Reduction of Traditional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] On 19 November 1990, the 22 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] in Paris, which stipulated the limits of conventional armaments kept by the two sides "within the geographical sphere from the Atlantic to the Urals." This was the first treaty on reducing conventional armaments concluded by the two major blocs since their founding, and marked a breakthrough in Europe's disarmament.

The formal talks on this treaty began on 9 March last year. Seven rounds of talks were held in 20 months. Because the Soviet Union carried out unilateral disarmament and accepted the principle of "asymmetrical disarmament," which meant that the superior side should reduce more armaments and take action first, the

NATO allies were prompted to unify their policy and pace and the talks were thus advanced steadily.

Before the beginning of the fifth round of talks on 12 January this year, the two sides had reached agreement on the limits to the number of tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters; however, differences remained over the armament limits for each country, the categories of aircraft, reserve weapons, troops, and measures for verification and weapon dismantlement.

The drastic changes in the situation in Eastern Europe last winter and spring and the quickening pace of Germany's reunification gave further prominence to the need for stabilizing the situation in Europe. Shortly after the beginning of the fifth round of talks, Bush proposed that the number of troops stationed by the United States and the Soviet Union in central Europe be reduced to 195,000, and as the Soviet Union enjoys geographical superiority, the United States can station another 30,000 troops in Britain and southern Europe.

On the surface, this tried to impose on the Soviet Union something that it could hardly accept; but Bush's proposal in fact took Moscow's actual difficulties into account. The drastic changes in Eastern Europe had made the withdrawal of Soviet troops a necessity. At that time, the Soviet Union had decided to completely withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary within 18 months. Bush's proposal would not only mitigate the pressure on the unilateral force withdrawal of the Soviet side, but also would legalize both sides' stationing troop in central Europe.

This was more than what the Soviet Union wanted. So it accepted every point of Bush's proposal in a period of two weeks. To seek support from Britain and France for its negotiation policy, the United States persistently avoided discussing the issue of limiting troops stationed by the allies in Germany.

The results of the elections in East Germany on 18 March showed that it would be hard to resist Germany's rapid reunification and its participation in NATO. The voice calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany was also increasing. Therefore, shortly after the beginning of the sixth round of talks, the Soviet Union proposed that limits on armaments in Germany be especially stipulated, and demanded that the troops stationed by the two major blocs in central Europe be reduced to below the 700,000-750,000 level; however, NATO rejected the Soviet proposal.

The main differences mentioned above were solved after the Soviet Union's terms for Germany's reunification were guaranteed. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the two Germanys signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement of the German Issue, in which they delimited Germany's boundary after its reunification, stipulated that Germany is not allowed to produce and possess nuclear and chemical weapons, and required Germany to reduce its troops to 370,000 within three to four years.

Then, West Germany and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year good-neighbor and cooperation treaty. They pledged not to be the first to use force against each other. West Germany also promised to offer 12 billion DM to the Soviet Union for resettling the troops withdrawn from East Germany. These treaties and pledges played a major role in advancing the disarmament talks and the eventual conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The treaty included the five categories of "offensive" heavy equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, fighter planes, and helicopters in the scope of disarmament, and formulated four levels of armament limits. First, the armament limits were given on each bloc—20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored vehicles, 20,000 cannons, 6,800 fighter planes, and 2,000 helicopters. Second, the limits were given on three categories of equipment in active service—16,500 tanks, 17,000 cannons, and 17,300 armored vehicles, with the equipment exceeding the limits being kept in warehouses. Third, regional armament limits were given—the limits on armaments deployed in the four regions—central Europe, extended central Europe, the region stretching from the Atlantic and the Urals, and the flank region. Fourth, armament limits were given for individual countries—that is, 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,700 cannons, 5,150 fighters, and 1,500 helicopters, which account for two-thirds of the total armaments kept by the two blocs. According to the above limits, NATO and the Warsaw Pact will separately work out the arms limits for their own member countries.

According to calculations, the quantity of weapons that the Soviet Union should reduce accounts for over 70 percent of the total reductions made by the 22 countries, and the armaments of the West European allies in NATO will not be reduced substantially.

To prevent the frontline of the military confrontation and the areas where most armaments are deployed in Europe from becoming the hotbed of new conflicts, the treaty lays down special limits on the armament level in central Europe, which includes Germany and six other countries. It is stipulated that the armament limits on central Europe can be shifted to the extended region of central Europe or to the region from the Atlantic to the Urals, but no additional armaments can be moved from other regions into central Europe. It is also stipulated that Germany can only possess no more than 4,166 tanks, 3,446 armored vehicles, 2,705 cannons, 900 fighter planes, and 306 helicopters. As an appendix to the treaty, the German Government stated that the number of its troops would be limited to 370,000. The 195,000 troop limit for the United States and the Soviet Union in central Europe, which both sides agreed to earlier, was also included in the second-phase treaty.

It should be pointed out that there were many loopholes in the treaty, which was hastily drawn up in 20 months. For example, the treaty did not lay down any limit on the quality of the weapons, nor did it restrain the transfer of

weapons to other regions outside Europe. The Soviet Union and NATO were both adjusting their armaments deployed in the relevant regions and countries to keep the most advanced weapons and eliminate the outmoded equipment.

The Soviet Union is now shifting thousands and thousands of pieces of such heavy weapons as tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, and planes to central Asia east to the Urals; and the Western countries are also shifting and selling weapons they do not need to countries outside Europe. The weapons that are transferred to other regions will not only pose dangers to the security in other regions, but will continue to be potential threats against Europe.

While lowering the armament level in Europe, the treaty will also result in eliminating the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional armaments over the West and promoting Europe's disarmament process and the tendency toward the "equilibrium of strength at a low level." NATO held that the Soviet Union's military threats against it had reached the lowest point since the end of World War II.

The treaty will prompt the armament structure and the military strategy in Europe to change its defensive orientation, will lower the possibility of the outbreak of surprise and large-scale attacks, and will be favorable to peace in Europe. The Soviet Union has announced that the Soviet armed forces "will carry out their structural adjustment in the defensive orientation," and NATO has also stated that it would give up the "frontline defense" strategy and would rely more on the mobilization of reserve forces. NATO and the Soviet Union also agreed that talks on short-range missiles in Europe would begin as soon as the conventional disarmament treaty came into force. This will extend the change in Europe's armament structure from the conventional field to the nuclear field.

With the treaty's implementation, the West will basically realize its main objective of weakening the Soviet Union's military threat. While the external pressure is lessened, the security interest contradictions between various NATO allies will come to the surface. In the future, they will approach and handle various issues more from their own national interests rather than the

interests of the whole bloc. Therefore, the situation of the follow-up talks, which have begun, will become more complicated.

Spokesman Denies Nuclear Warheads Sent to Saudis

*OW1401101591 Beijing XINHUA in English
0943 GMT 14 Jan 91*

[Text] Beijing, January 14 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied here this afternoon that China ever shipped nuclear warheads to Saudi Arabia.

A correspondent said the British magazine FOREIGN REPORT quoted on January 10 a report of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency saying that China ever shipped twelve nuclear warheads to Saudi Arabia [sentence as received]. The spokesman was asked to confirm this.

The spokesman said, "that report is totally groundless."

UN Conference on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Ends

*OW1801230591 Beijing XINHUA in English
2239 GMT 18 Jan 91*

[Text] United Nations, January 18 (XINHUA)—The amendment conference of the states parties to the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) ended today with no progress on the converting of the PTBT into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).

Speakers at the conference, which began on January 7, stressed that a comprehensive ban would serve as a barrier to nuclear proliferation, prevent the development of new nuclear weapons and facilitate an end to the arms race.

But the United States and Britain rejected any proposal for immediate approach to a comprehensive ban. They insist on the view that nuclear weapons served as a deterrent to war.

Many participants rejected the view. It is widely recognized among the participants that the conference is a total failure.

The conference called upon all the depositary powers of the PTBT—the U.S., the Soviet Union and Britain—to fulfill their treaty obligations and pursue a comprehensive ban.

INDONESIA

Foreign Minister Views UN Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Conference

BK2201064591 Jakarta ANTARA in English 0617 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Jakarta, January 22 (OANA-ANTARA)—The conference to amend the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into a total ban in New York on January 17-18, proceeded smoothly and the result was satisfactory although not comprehensive. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas told the press on arrival at Sukarno-Hatta airport here on Monday evening.

The conference which was initiated by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, elected Ali Alatas as conference chairman, flanked by ten vice chairmen and a secretary.

According to Alatas, the conference which was attended by 96 delegations from 117 countries as well as delegates from 15 countries and international and non-governmental organizations as observers, was opened by U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

From the outset it was obvious that the main objective of the conference would not be achieved because two of the three nuclear powers which were the nuclear depositors, namely the United States and Britain, opposed the amendment.

The only nuclear power which agreed to the amendment is the Soviet Union. However, based on the treaty, agreement of all the nuclear powers is needed to adopt the amendment, he explained.

The conference to amend the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which so far only covered tests in the atmosphere and underwater, was aimed at extending the ban into a total one with the inclusion of underground tests.

According to Alatas, there were two opposing parties in the conference.

On the one hand, the U.S. and Britain, backed by several countries of the West, were of the opinion that the ban on nuclear tests should not be tackled in the conference, while on the other hand the initiator and non-nuclear countries insisted on the conference to proceed as scheduled, he asserted.

To overcome the problem, Alatas as conference chairman tried to find a compromise formula, but failed in his endeavour, so that voting became necessary, which resulted in 75 countries in favour, two against and 19 abstain.

The conference also discussed the verification aspects of the test ban for the treaty's enforcement. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said.

BULGARIA

Envoy's Statement to UN Nuclear Test Ban Conference

1U1501082391 Sofia BTA in English 0802 GMT
15 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 15 (BTA)—At the UN Conference on the Achievement of a Total Ban on Nuclear Weapon Tests, Bulgaria expressed the stand that this aim can be realized gradually, step by step. Mr. Dimitur Kostov, Bulgaria's standing representative in the world organization, said that this approach is obviously more realistic than the demand for adopting an immediate ban.

Bulgaria was elected deputy chairman of this important conference. In his statement Mr. D. Kostov pointed out that this country is for a speedy achievement of a total ban on nuclear weapon tests and expressed the opinion that today it is quite possible to determine by technological means whether this treaty is being observed. Mr. Kostov declared himself for decreasing the number of nuclear weapon tests and stressed that gradual restrictions can be achieved through negotiations between the nuclear states.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Envoy Addresses UN Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Conference

LD1101105991 Prague CTK in English 0847 GMT
11 Jan 91

[Text] New York, January 11 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia believes that a global nuclear test ban should be asserted gradually in new conditions of the development of international relations. Czechoslovak Permanent Representative in the U.N. Eduard Kukan said here yesterday.

He added that use should be made of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue and multilateral negotiations at the conference on disarmament in Geneva should be extended.

Czechoslovakia's independent foreign policy favours a total nuclear test ban as an inseparable part of the process of the limitation and liquidation of nuclear weapons. According to Czechoslovakia the number of explosions a year should be radically reduced, Kukan said.

Addressing a conference on amending the nuclear test ban treaty by a ban on underground nuclear tests, he voiced satisfaction with the present observance of the treaty. On the other hand, however, the treaty has failed to stop the nuclear arms race and has not met the hope of non-nuclear states for reaching a total nuclear test ban soon, Kukan said.

Last Soviet Air Fighter Squadron Leaves

1U2301123091 Prague CTK in English 2123 GMT
21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague, January 21 (CTK)—Soviet Army 114th Air Fighter Squadron left Milovice, central Bohemia, today, being the last Soviet Army Central Group Squadron left on the Czechoslovak territory.

As many as 24 MiG-23 fighters and 10 cutting-edge MiG-29s returned to the Soviet Union. They landed at the Ukrainian Ivano-Frankovsk airport and will be part of the Carpathian Military District.

The chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for the Soviet Army Withdrawal Supervision Michael Kocab has expressed a positive view on today's action in spite of a three hours delay caused by bad weather at the Soviet airport. He voiced the conviction that all Soviet soldiers will withdraw as agreed.

The mixed commission for the Soviet Army withdrawal met at the Milovice airport today. It recommended that the Soviet troops stationed till now in the former GDR should not use Czechoslovak territory on their way home until at least June 30, 1991 in view of the situation in the Baltic republics and in order to ensure a smooth Soviet Army withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.

Kocab said a three member sub-commission was set up to deal permanently with the complaints of Czechoslovak citizens who suffered harm in connection with the Soviet Army arrival, stay or withdrawal. He also announced that the mixed commission will take a stand on the prepared intergovernmental agreement on the settlement of property questions. The wording of it exists already but most of the articles have two versions, a Czechoslovak and a Soviet one. The commission wants to examine it more closely and recommend the final form of the agreement.

There are still seven Soviet transport planes and 21 non-combatant helicopters left in Czechoslovakia as well as 16,500 soldiers, 71 tanks, 266 armored vehicles, 4,757 trucks and 133 artillery weapons.

The 146 combat helicopters and all 30 launchers have already been withdrawn. The last unit will leave Czechoslovakia exactly one year after the intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal was signed, i.e., February 26, 1991. The final stage of withdrawal will end June 30, 1991.

Soviet Withdrawal From Germany Via CSFR Discussed

Transport Ministry Official Comments

LD2201121491 Prague CTK in English 1911 GMT
22 Jan 91

[Text] Prague, January 22 (CTK)—A leading official of the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry today confirmed

to CTK the information carried by farmers' daily "ZEMEDELSE NOVINY" today that the possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany via Czechoslovakia is being discussed.

The withdrawal was discussed yesterday and today by representatives of Czechoslovak Railways, the German Reichsbahn Railway Company and the German Transport Ministry. According to ZEMEDELSE NOVINY, crossing the territory of Czechoslovakia to the USSR would be 100,000 soldiers, 50,000 civilians and unspecified amounts of military hardware.

Karel Sellner, director of the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry's Railway Department, said that the primary condition for realizing this exacting project is consent from the Czechoslovak Government, or the federal Foreign Ministry.

Only then—in March or April—would it be possible to start specifying economic and operational conditions. From the technical point of view, the withdrawal could start only in the second half of this year when the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia will have been completed (it is to be finished by June 30), Sellner said.

According to ZEMEDELSE NOVINY, the project would earn Czechoslovakia 1,000 million Swiss francs.

Commission Opposed

LD2201222491 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] The mixed legislative commission for overseeing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory adopted a resolution in which, regarding the international situation and public opinion, it has not recommended the transit of Soviet troops from Germany through Czechoslovak territory.

Michel Kocab, the chairman of the commission, said on the topic:

[Begin Kocab recording] There are also other ways to withdraw the Soviet Army from German territory. They can go through Poland. The USSR has had intensive talks about this with Poland. We would not like to worsen Poland's negotiating position with our hasty consent to transit through our territory as Poland is connecting this transit with the departure of Soviet troops from its territory. There is also the option of going over the Baltic Sea. So there are a number of possibilities. One must say in this connection that the speed of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia has been decided upon largely by taking into consideration how much our railroads can take without congestion. This means that if we transported a further four to six trains from Germany, it might mean a complication which could ensue in slowing down the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR. We would not like to allow this to happen in view of the unpredictable policy of the current Kremlin. [end recording]

HUNGARY

Soviet Troops Withdrawing 'According to Schedule'

LD1501192491 Budapest MTI in English 1357 GMT
14 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 14 (MTI)—The Soviet troops are withdrawing according to schedule. Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, told MTI on Monday.

There is no sign of the pull-out slowing down: On Sunday six trains left the country, with boarding of several more currently taking place.

Since March last year, 60 percent of the 100,000 or so soldiers from the southern army troops, plus relatives, have left the country, including 80 percent of combat units. To date, 850 of the 1,352 trains have crossed into Soviet territory.

POLAND

Arms Reductions, Restructuring Under CFE Detailed

LD0801192591 Warsaw PAP in English 1536 GMT
8 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, January 8—The treaty on reduction of conventional armed forces [CFE] signed in Paris last year sets the maximum quotas on armaments in Europe. Since 1989, Poland has been undertaking restructuring efforts to limit her military potential.

As a result, on December 31, 1990, the Polish Armed Forces were equipped with 2,850 tanks (including only 757 modern T-72 ones), below the January 1989 figure of 3,350 and above the quota of 1,730, 654 fighter planes (with the quota set at 460), 2,377 armoured personnel carriers (4,855 in January 1989, quota 2,150), 40 combat helicopters (quota 130), 2,300 pieces of over 100mm artillery and missile launchers (3,065 in January 1989, quota 1,610).

The treaty provides for a 40-month period for reduction of particular kinds of weapons.

Some of the Polish equipment is obsolete and it is rather doubtful that it could be resold. Poland is facing big purchases. Expenses could be reduced owing to a possible agreement with Germany providing for Poland's taking over of some modern equipment of the former GDR army.

Soviet Troop Deployment in Country Viewed

LD0901200891 Warsaw PAP in English 1922 GMT
9 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, January 9—About 50 thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed in Poland currently, together with

back-up personnel and family members this figure reaches about 90 thousand people.

Spokesman for the government plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, speaking at a news conference today, said that Soviet troops stationed in Poland since 1944 are deployed in 35 garrisons in 15 voivodships and have in use about 70 thousand hectares of land. The status of the Soviet troops stationed in Poland is regulated by the December 1956 Polish-Soviet agreement.

The spokesman said that the Soviet side withdrew a landing troops' brigade from Bialogard, Koszalin voivodship, and an Air Force squadron from Brzeg, Opole voivodship, all in all, about seven thousand soldiers.

Speaking about investments ordered by the Soviet Army, implemented in the so-called internal export, Golebiowski said that profits in the first eleven months of 1990 reached about 12 million dollars and deliveries of goods to Poland worth over 52 billion zloties. Poland, in virtue of damages stemming from the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, received over 340 million zloties last year.

Colonel Golebiowski also added that Deputy Premier Leszek Balcerowicz has set up a special team to assess all costs borne by Poland in connection with the stationing of Soviet troops.

The spokesman also told newsmen that Polish military prosecutor's offices conducted 75 investigations against Soviet soldiers during the first half of last year. In result of crimes committed by those soldiers, four persons died, 11 suffered body injuries, while material losses were assessed at over 220 million zloties.

Army To Reduce Troop Strength Over 5-7 Years

*LD0901112891 Warsaw PAP in English 1012 GMT
9 Jan 91*

[Text] Warsaw, January 9—Polish Armed Forces will reduce their numbers from about 305,000 soldiers to some 230,000-250,000 during 5-7 years from now and the proportion of professional military personnel will grow up to about 50 percent, deputy chief of the Polish Army General Staff General Franciszek Puchala told the press today.

The military would not mind having a civilian chief of the Defence Ministry, Puchala declared.

Preparations Under Way for Soviet Troop Transit

*LD1101235591 Warsaw PAP in English 2231 GMT
10 Jan 91*

[Text] Warsaw, January 10—Poland and the Soviet Union have not yet signed an agreement on the transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany via Poland.

At issue are some 370 thousand Soviet soldiers and a total of about 900 thousand people including civilian personnel and families. Some of them will reach the USSR by sea. Poland prohibits the transport of dangerous weapons and armed troops through its territory.

Despite a lack of final legal regulations pertaining to the transit, preparations are under way in some voivodships which will be included in the road evacuation route.

The first section of this route, running from the border crossing in Kolbaskowo has already been examined. It turned out that car weights are necessary to determine the tonnage of the convoys. Some rebuilding is called for in the border section itself.

The route across the Koszalin and Slupsk Voivodships is 170 km long. The mayors of some towns along the way are against the movement of Soviet troops through their cities. In Człuchow, for instance, there are many old buildings which could suffer from the massive convoys. The only way out is to build bypasses and broaden some streets. In Człuchow alone, the costs are estimated at 25 billion zlotys (2.5 million dollars).

The roads in the Gdansk voivodship do not require any special adjustment of the transit of the troops. The city of Malbork will be a "bottleneck" for Soviet convoys in the Elblag Voivodship. Three bridges will have to be renovated on the Elblag-Kaliningrad highway.

Spokesman Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal Timetable

*LD1101225191 Warsaw PAP in English 1538 GMT
11 Jan 91*

[Text] Warsaw, January 11—"Our stand is clear—we wish for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland to begin before the start of the transit of Soviet troops from Germany. We want the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland to be completed by the end of this year," spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Ministry Wladyslaw Klawnski told PAP today.

Both those operations may coincide in time, but should be carried out on the basis of a Polish-Soviet agreement on withdrawal and transit of these troops. Currently both sides are holding talks on this matter.

Poland is a sovereign state and all movements of Soviet troops fall under Polish jurisdiction. Only Poland may undertake a decision whether and on what conditions such movements can take place in Poland, said Klawnski.

No USSR Military Traffic Reportedly Authorized

*LD1101230291 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 2200 GMT 11 Jan 91*

[Text] Lieutenant General Franciszek Puchala, deputy chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, has reported

that no movements of any kind of Soviet military motor columns have been authorized on Polish territory.

Soviet Troop Talks Show 'No Breakthrough'

LD1201010891 Warsaw PAP in English 2253 GMT
11 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, January 11—There is no breakthrough but progress was made, is how deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's European Department and chairman of the Polish inter-ministerial delegation Grzegorz Koszewska Zorbas summed up the third round of Polish-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and on their transit from Germany that ended here today.

A treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland has in principle been prepared for signing. A date of starting and ending this operation is the question that has to be agreed.

Poland adopted a stand that the operation of the evacuation transit should not be started earlier than the operation of withdrawal from Poland.

Asked to comment on an article in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Soviet Army daily suggesting that troops in Poland should not be withdrawn before pulling troops out from Germany, the representative of the Polish Foreign Ministry said that the stand was absolutely unacceptable and that this was not a stand of the Soviet Government.

Spokesman Claims Progress in Troop Pullout Talks

AU2201132391 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Maria Wagrowska report: "When Will the Pullout Begin?"]

[Text] There is no direct link between Soviet military intervention in Lithuania and the fact that the Soviet Northern Army Group (50,000 troops) is stationed in Poland. The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Soviet Troops in Poland also stated that it had not observed any troop movements that could be linked to events in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the military operation in Vilnius forces one to look at the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Poland in a completely different light. It touches on the political, psychological, and security aspects of the problem and requires that these troops be withdrawn as soon as possible.

For operational reasons, a Moscow preoccupied with its internal crisis in Lithuania and other Baltic republics may prefer to keep its troops in Poland for longer than presently envisaged. Events in Lithuania show that it is highly desirable to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Poland first and then begin the transport of Soviet units presently in the former GDR. This is also the view of the Polish authorities.

In the meantime, despite progress in Polish-Soviet talks on this issue (the third round has just finished in Moscow), no date for the withdrawal is in sight. This date is a high-level political decision. According to RZECZPOSPOLITA's sources, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski supposedly sent a letter on the subject to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze [Aleksandr Bessmertnykh appointed foreign minister on 15 January]. Asked to confirm this, Deputy Director of the European Department Grzegorz Koszewska-Zorbas replied that he had no comment, but it was certain that the matter of Soviet troops would be on the agenda during Soviet Defense Minister Yazov's upcoming visit in Warsaw, assuming this still goes ahead.

Koszewska-Zorbas said that, in principle, a treaty on Soviet troop withdrawal was ready for signing and he dismissed rumors that no progress on a transit agreement had been made in Moscow.

In connection with the information circulating after talks held by a delegation of the People's Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and republic representatives in the Polish Sejm that the Soviet Union could not guarantee the end of 1991 deadline for troop withdrawals (as requested by the Polish government), we asked Deputy Jerzy Gólaczyński, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, to comment. He said: "The talks were held at the Soviet Union's suggestion. It wanted to inform the Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and German legislatures of its position. Polish Sejm deputies argued strongly and unambiguously that the fact of withdrawal was beyond discussion and that they wanted it to take place before the planned transit of Soviet troops in Germany, or, if this proved impossible, to combine the two operations. Soviet deputies argued that the pullout from Poland must follow the pullout from Germany. The Soviet troops in Poland could oversee the transit of troops from Germany. We replied that we were ready to offer our services. The talks were beneficial, but at times difficult and strained. Some of the Soviet deputies told us that they understood our laws, but argued for an understanding of their situation and lack of infrastructure needed for returning troops and families. They maintained that this made it impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to a date. Our meeting ended on a positive note: both sides agreed to press for a rapid agreement in this matter and to continue to monitor the whole process. We are also interested to know where the returning troops are to be finally stationed. The Soviet deputies invited us to visit the Soviet Union.

On 12 January, a Soviet military train from Germany bound for Kaliningrad was halted at the Szczecin-Gumienice station because its transit papers were not in order. After clarification, the train was allowed to continue on its way. These incidents give rise to concern. There are rumors that toward the end of last year, Polish State Railways [PKP] "agreed" to transport Soviet troops from Germany across Poland at an advantageous price.

We asked Deputy Transport Minister Witold Chodakiewicz to comment. He said: "The PKP merely provides the 'containers on wheels.' It is an important element in the state's policy, but only in a technical sense. I want to underscore that nobody has signed anything. The transit of Soviet troops across Polish territory proceeds in line with earlier agreements. According to an agreement from 1956, the Soviet Union has a right to two supply trains traveling from east to west every 24 hours. There is also the normal transit traffic from Czechoslovakia towards Braniewo, again one or two trains every 24 hours, and the third category is essential transport movement at times of troop relocation. Last year we also had the transport of withdrawn Soviet military equipment following the Vienna treaty. As regards the supposed transport agreement, this might be a reference to the Jachranka Agreement which raised the fee for rail transport for Soviet Army needs (up by 10 percent from 1 January 1991). Presumably the same fee structure will apply to the transport of Soviet troops when the pullout takes place.

Soviet Army's Dubynin Cited on Troop Withdrawal

LD1601162591 Warsaw P1P in English 1303 GMT
16 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, January 16—"The pulling out of Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland is ruled out before the complete withdrawal of the Western Group of the Soviet Army from Germany," Gen. Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army stationed in Poland, said at the start of the third round of Polish-Soviet negotiations held in Moscow between Jan. 10 and 11, the GAZETA WYBORCZA paper reported today.

Following are excerpts of the text of Dubynin's statement delivered during the negotiations, carried by the ZNAMYA POBYEDY paper issued for Soviet soldiers in Poland and reprinted by GAZETA WYBORCZA:

"The Polish side (...) tries to present the soldiers of the northern groups of the Soviet Army as occupants and international offenders. It wants them to withdraw from its territory like POW's—in closed and sealed cars, disarmed, with no military equipment. In this way it is going to dishonour the army which in the years 1944-45 liberated the Polish nation. (...) established Poland's Western border on the Odra and Nysa rivers.

"If the Polish side voluntarily rejects habits adopted in the civilised world, we have a right to pose a question: Who will pay us for human losses suffered during the liberation of Poland...?

"(...) As the commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army I firmly state: We will be going back home—there is no other possibility. But we will be leaving holding our heads high, with spread banners, satisfied that we have fulfilled an internationalist duty, with dignity and honour. And if the Polish side does not

agree with the Soviet protocol settling legal, property and financial issues and does not show goodwill, the Soviet Army will nevertheless enter the territory of the superpower, the Soviet Union, following our plans and routes we have planned. In this case we will be only responsible for the lives and health of Soviet citizens and we will shake off responsibility for the Polish side."

In connection with this statement Polish Foreign Vice-Minister Jerzy Makarczyk admitted the existing Polish-Soviet differences but said that Dubynin's statement was not an official stand of Soviet political authorities.

The Soviet press attache in Warsaw told "GAZETA WYBORCZA" that his embassy had not obtained any information on this issue.

Foreign Minister Calls Fears Over Soviet Pullout 'Unfounded'

LD2201162191 Warsaw ZYCH WARSZAWY in Polish
17 Jan 91 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Kazimierz Woyciecki; place and date not given: "The Continuity of Polish Efforts in a Turbulent World"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Woyciecki] In light of the Soviet behavior in Lithuania, does not the issue of Soviet troops in Poland and their withdrawal assume special significance? Does the German side understand the problems linked with the transportation of Soviet troops from the former GDR through Poland and the simultaneous pullout of Soviet troops stationed in Poland?

[Skubiszewski] No. The troop pullout issue is an issue that is extremely important in itself. We have certain contacts with the Germans on this, but let us be realistic, the issue is solely between Poland and the Soviet Union.

[Woyciecki] Certain Soviet military voices have said that Poland's suggested conditions for the troop withdrawal are highly undignified. What is your comment?

[Skubiszewski] Poland has great experience in matters relating to Soviet military transit from Germany to the Soviet Union and vice versa, as well as to the constant coming and going of Soviet troops that are stationed in Poland. These things have been going on for decades and have been done in an orderly fashion. Thus, all fears of—and I quote—"undignified conditions for troop withdrawals" are completely unfounded, because nothing like this has ever happened before and will not happen. Poland has not made any new demands in this sphere. Concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Germany, all we want is to conclude an agreement on the matter. The reason for this is that there will be a substantial increase of additional transit traffic and this needs to be regulated. I would like to recall that the normal or so-called routine traffic from Germany to

the USSR, and vice versa, is going on all the time without any problems. Thus, there is no basis for these unfavorable comments.

[Woycicki] What stance is Poland going to take in relation to Czechoslovakia's suggestion to consider withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact as an answer to the events in Lithuania? Is it possible for closer regional cooperation between Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague in light of the developing situation in the Soviet Union?

[Skubiszewski] Until now—that is to say this afternoon, January 16—there has not been any such proposition. Late on 14 January, I spoke twice on the telephone with Minister Dienstbier. This was after my earlier interview on the same day. There were no concrete suggestions, but we shall meet next week. The issue of dismantling the military structure and through this finally putting an end to the Warsaw Pact is much older than the Lithuanian crisis. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Lithuanian crisis are distinct matters and each is being tackled according to different categories, and, let us not forget, by different countries. In relation to your question on the regional policy, the policy is not linked to the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

[Woycicki] So despite this stormy period in world politics, the fundamental lines of our foreign policy can be continued?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, above all they must be continued. We must also see to it that they are continued despite the fact that there are difficulties in our negotiations with the USSR in relation to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. It is a matter of agreeing on a date for the pullout. This is still outstanding. I never doubted that this would become a difficult issue, but it has become even more complicated as a result of certain changes that are taking place in the USSR. With Minister Shevardnadze there was complete agreement on our cooperation and acceptance of the new Polish situation and Poland's new politics. Shevardnadze understood the changes occurring in Eastern and Central Europe and knew that they are irreversible. I am pleased that a new Soviet foreign minister has been appointed and I look forward to cooperating with the new minister.

This cooperation should go well, especially now that our present relations require close cooperation between our respective ministries to solve certain issues, particularly the treaty on Soviet troops withdrawal and the treaty on the transit arrangements for Soviet troops from Germany to the USSR. These treaties are for all intents and purposes ready and could be signed tomorrow.

[Woycicki] Could the complications occurring in the democratic processes in the Soviet Union have a profound effect on Polish foreign policy? Formerly there was talk of replacing the theory of two enemies with the theory of two friends. Is this still valid and to what extent will unfavorable developments in the USSR create a need for a closer alliance with the West?

[Skubiszewski] Let us not talk of enemies or friends. This is the language of journalistic overstatement, not of the realities of international politics. Poland must have good relations and close cooperation on both its west and east flanks.

The disturbances in the building of democracy in the Soviet Union are an obvious complication that affects international relations, but I want to reiterate that our multilateral and developing links with the USSR are not just a function of what is happening in the Soviet Union. These links are independent. I only have to point to our efforts to enter the European Communities. Although this is a long term thing, it is already being realized in our policy through certain steps we are taking.

Sejm Committee Chairman Confident on Soviet Troop Pullout

1U2201204591 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 21 Jan 91 p 11

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, by Piotr Pacewicz; place and date not given: "Have We Done All We Could for Lithuania?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Pacewicz] Why are talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland taking so long?

[Geremek] This aspect has been addressed by the Polish Government properly. The talks at the ministerial level led one to believe that the Soviet pullout could be completed by the end of 1991. Lately, we have observed worrying signals. It would appear that Soviet military circles are beginning to manifest a tendency to delay the whole operation.

[Pacewicz] Will the presence of Soviet troops in Poland become a factor in that political game?

[Geremek] It could play a role in the conflict between the more liberal political groups on the one side and the military and party diehards on the other. The situation in the Baltic republics seems to show that the Soviet leadership does not fully control the Army's actions.

It is very hard to imagine, however, that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the presence of the 45,000-strong Soviet contingent in Poland could be sustained for much longer. They have no significant military purpose.

[Pacewicz] Are you so certain? Do you not share the fears that the West, wishing to maintain Soviet support for the war with Iraq, will allow the Kremlin to return to its imperial tendencies and move its frontiers to the Odra-Nysa [Oder-Neisse] River?

[Geremek] In Soviet politics there is a clear distinction between its internal and external empires. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the former GDR were

part of its external empire, and this has now completely disintegrated. I think elements in the Soviet Union fully realize this.

[Pacewicz] What do you mean by Soviet elements?

[Geremek] Both the politicians and the military. The internal empire is being shaken by the collapse of the former relationship between the center and the republics. It looked as if Gorbachev's policies were aiming for a confederation system. That policy has presently collapsed. This has an impact on the situation in Poland purely because we are the immediate neighbors, but this influence is comparable to the influence felt by the rest of Europe. In other words, I do not think that changes—even the most profound reversal—in Soviet politics could turn back Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian evolutions to independence and self determination. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister: 'No Impasse' on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2401105291 Warsaw PAP in English 0932 GMT
24 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Warsaw, January 24: Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski talked extensively with GAZETA WYBORCZA interviewers on a number of issues: The problem of withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Poland, Poland's attitude towards and relations with Lithuania, relations with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Polish-Czechoslovak relations.

At the outset, the minister stated he was not afraid of Soviet military action against Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. "The changes have gone too far for a military action to change anything for one thing and to be tolerated by the western states, the United States in particular for another. The NATO has its place in the European security system and cannot stay indifferent vis-a-vis perils in the Central European region."

"The events in Lithuania and in other Baltic republics arouse anxiety but I believe the Soviet Union will not overstep some border of action. This is our eastern wall."

Further on the minister said there was no impasse in the negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. "There is only one sticking point - the date for pulling the Soviet troops out," said he, adding the Soviet side does not agree to complete the withdrawal by the end of this year.

"This way or another the attitude that Soviet troops will leave Poland after they are gone from Germany is unacceptable to us," said Skubiszewski, adding that Poland's relations with Europe also call for their withdrawal. [passage omitted]

ARGENTINA**Foreign Minister Claims Iraq Financed Condor Research***PY2301003091 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS**ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2258 GMT 22 Jan 91*

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 22 January (NA)—Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo today charged the previous Radical Civic Union (UCR) administration with "selling missile technology" to Iraq and said that the "Condor-2" vector project was being financed with Iraqi capital.

Minister Cavallo said the money used [words indistinct] project "was Iraqi money with that of the companies associated with Argentina to transfer technology to Iraq."

"This is why, in September 1989, when we received all the information on the project, we made the political decision, which was highly criticized by the UCR, [word indistinct] interrupt the initiative," Cavallo said today during the program "Having Lunch With Mitha Legrand," broadcast by Argentina Televisora Color.

The foreign minister added that Argentina has never transferred nuclear technology to Iraq, and pointed out that the National Atomic Energy Commission "has been very clear and correct in its handling of this matter." [passage omitted]

ALGERIA

National Defense Minister Discusses Disarmament

91WC0032A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
19 Nov 90 p 2

[First three paragraphs are EL MOUDJAHID introduction]

[Excerpt] Activities at the seminar "Arms and Disarmament" were opened yesterday at the Tamentfoust (Algiers) Superior School for Naval Forces by National Defense Minister General-Major Khaled Nezzar, in the presence of National Institute for Global Strategic Studies (INESG) Director Mr. M'hamed Yazid and General Chief of Staff General Abdelmalek Guenaizia.

Commanders of the sea, land, and air forces, high officials of the National Army, the president of the ANP Defense Commission, and national military and civilian experts also took part in the two-day meeting.

The first day of the seminar was dedicated to presentations on threat evaluation, and descriptions of defense systems, weapons, disarmament, and methods of access to the defense industries.

National Defense Minister General-Major Khaled Nezzar delivered a speech yesterday morning at the opening of the "Arms and Disarmament" seminar, which will last two days at the Tamentfoust Superior School for Naval Forces in Algiers. Following is the text of his speech:

"This seminar, which I have the pleasure and privilege of inaugurating today and that is dedicated to a pertinent and timely topic, "Arms and Disarmament," comes five months after the one discussing "Upheavals in Eastern Europe and Their Implications for Maghreb Security," and a few days after the one attempting to evaluate the "Impacts of the Gulf Crisis on Oil Policy." [passage omitted]

"The issues of arms and disarmament cannot be separated from either our global conception of security or our deep attachment to peace and international cooperation. They thus are of paramount importance from the point of view of our capacity to manage both of them in a viable manner and fulfill our commitments in an environment that is fluctuating and unforgiving for the weak. It is necessary to establish these issues in a framework more in agreement with the implications of the strategic choices and decisions presupposed for countries like ours, and this in a world context where threats can appear in different forms and where military power, rather than being the ultimate recourse, instead becomes an increasingly privileged instrument for managing conflict in the sense of consolidating the strong's domination over the weak. That is, reflection on these questions logically follows from reflection on the Gulf crisis, which

has the dangerous distinction of combining all the ingredients, antagonisms, high stakes and challenges that risk leading to a conflagration with grave consequences for the region and world peace. The Arab world should redouble its efforts to try to find a global, just, peaceful and honorable solution for all parties in a region that has been in turmoil for half of a century, a solution based upon an attitude inspired solely in Arab interests and not in the interests of external strategic hegemonies.

What Threat?

"In an international context marked by the strengthening of economic, military and technological hegemony, by the disappearance of the bipolar nature of the world that gave an essential *raison d'être* to the unrestrained arms policies of military interventionism in the name of very dubious principles, one has the right to be skeptical of the real objectives of disarmament.

"We find, however, that neither the innumerable instruments and mechanisms of bi- or multi-lateral negotiations, nor the conventions and agreements concluded to this day, have been able to ameliorate the basic problems. For countries such as ours, the task of disarmament reverts to an illusion. In effect, despite the propaganda and appearances, the world equilibrium remains very precarious, mistrust is still very much alive, and the course of the major weapons systems and massive destruction is far from experiencing a slowdown, much less the desired reversal. The decelerations noted here and there are purely routine or planned, commonly known as structural disarmament. As proof, one need only analyze the available statistics on military expenditures, the budgets assigned to military research and development, and the volumes of arms shipments around the world. We are far from general and complete disarmament and the reallocation of the resources that would thus be economized in favor of development in the poor countries. To top it off, it is precisely these poor countries that are pointed to and presented today as the primary threat, a threat from the south against which it is necessary to conceive and erect adaptive defensive systems.

"A kind of irony: underdevelopment, demography, and the Muslim religion are perceived as being forms of that threat.

"From what it is possible to observe of the task of disarmament, as it is conceived and practiced, it is evolving in two ways, depending on the status of the countries in the concert of nations.

"Disarmament for the world's powerful is in fact a planned process of declassifying weapons rendered obsolete by the joint evolution of threats and technology. One generation of airplanes or missiles is substituted for another, and as for the surplus of conventional and subpar weapons, it is dispersed to the Third World, thus simultaneously increasing their debt, their dependence, and the sources of regional destabilization by the simple mechanical effect of action-reaction.

Disarmament: A Fool's Contract

"For weak countries, disarmament is nothing more than a fool's contract, a contract of adherence to foreign and imposed concepts, certainly with commitments, which are never kept, of development assistance. Willingly or not, these countries see themselves isolated from access to all technology capable of representing, in the long term, the slightest risk for the security of northern countries or their allies.

"The desire for national security is one of the highest priorities. Considering the antagonisms, contradictions, and resorts to force that characterize international society, all nations dedicate a significant proportion of their resources to defense.

"Defense policies, of which the primary corollaries are the quantities and organization of forces, the doctrine of their use, weapons policies, etc., have as their highest objective the preservation of the integrity and unity of national territory and ensuring that at all times and in all situations the prerogatives of national sovereignty are exercised. Proceeding from the analysis and the optimization of multiple constraints, both foreign and domestic, defense policy is the best possible compromise that a nation can make with its resources. It is within this clearly evolving framework that it is necessary to situate the issues of arms policies, the construction and development of military industry and research, and the participation of national industry in satisfying the wishes of the army. Of course, for a country the size of ours, it is necessary to be aware of two things: first, the concept of self-sufficiency in weapons required by defense policy is very relative; second, no country can, from day to day, change its weapons; that demonstrates the complex nature of the ties between suppliers and acquirers. It is thus necessary to find the best equilibrium between counting on oneself and resorting to the outside, within the framework of mutually balanced interests.

"Over the course of its development, the credibility and efficiency of our defense strategy vis-a-vis such-and-such aggressor is a function not only of our intrinsic military capability in terms of the effectiveness and performance of men and materiel compared to those of the potential adversary, but also of the cohesion and unity of our people. That is one of the major lessons we were taught in our glorious war of national liberation, waged victoriously in the face of the formidable arsenal deployed by the colonial presence with the aid of its allies.

A Weak Status Is Unacceptable

"Although it is true that a country's power depends to a great extent on its financial resources and material wealth, it nevertheless also depends above all on the courage of its men, their determination, patriotism, capacity for imagination, and creative genius. Without that intimate union between the material factor and the human factor, it would be vain to hope to attain the status of a power as long as international society, controlled by a system of unjust rules, remains hostile to any will expressed in that regard.

"How can we, under these conditions, adhere completely to principles that strengthen the strong and weaken the weak by making an unjust world order persist? How, for example, can the Arab world or Africa believe in a concept that does nothing but consolidate the military power of Israel or South Africa? How can the Arab countries uncomplainingly accept the fact of Israel pointing its ballistic missiles with nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical warheads at their capitals? On the basis of what principle of international law are we denied what is permitted to others? The status of weakness is unacceptable.

"In the end, considering the new North-South cleavages and the size of the bets and the challenges, including technology, that are the veritable pillar of economic and military power, the limited resources of a single country cannot but be insufficient. Thus, one of the solutions could reside in the formation of homogeneous groups able to provide a worthy response to the large assemblies that have already been formed.

"To that end, we place a great deal of hope on the rapid consolidation of the Arab Maghreb, to serve as an example and provide a positive contribution to the construction of a united Arab space. Thanks to its civilizing and cultural values, its exceptional geographic position linking three continents, and its important resources, the Arab world is capable of being a factor of equilibrium and stability, provided, of course, that there is a genuine desire to resolve the basic problems. The great powers should give in to the evidence that they have more to gain from cooperation with a stable and developed Arab space than from any strategy that exacerbates tensions, isolation or exclusion.

"In conclusion, I will say that these thoughts are lines of reflection meant for you to fill in and complete, in order to provide to those who make decisions and take initiatives the guidance and elements that will permit a permanent adaptation of our policy and defense strategy to an international environment of rapid change. That is why we attach particular importance to the results of your work and exercises. I wish you, then, much success and I thank you for your attention.

GENERAL

Arbatov Article on Arms Reductions Criticized

PM1101171791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Doctor of Military Sciences V. Korobushin article: "Why Is This Being Done? Soviet Academician Appeals to the West's Public"]

[Text] I have been impelled to put pen to paper by an article that came to my notice, written by Academician G. Arbatov, USSR people's deputy, and recently published in Canada's newspaper THE CITIZEN [as published]. I do not presume to pass judgment on his activities as director of the United States of America and Canada Institute because I do not consider myself competent enough in the sphere that this prestigious research institute is called upon to study. But the item in THE CITIZEN is devoted not to the situation in the United States or Canada but to Soviet military policy and military organization problems, on which, I venture to suggest, I am amply qualified to pass judgment.

First of all let me note that Academician G. Arbatov does not say anything that is new to us in this article. His views on military and political problems are quite well known to Soviet people (he himself writes that he has devoted five OGOONEK articles, a couple of IZVESTIYA articles, and several television appearances to expounding them). They, these views, are distinguished by a quite specific—anti-Army—tendency. However, everyone has the right to have his own viewpoint on questions of one sort or another. But it is a different matter when people try to pass it off as the only correct viewpoint and foist it on everybody. Especially if the point at issue is in essence to ensure or, to be precise, to undermine the country's security. That is why his statements on this subject in the Soviet press have received a very firm rebuff.

And then the academician decided to appeal to the foreign public and bring his fundamental differences with Soviet military leaders out into the open, as the saying goes. Moreover, he was not too shy to inform his new readers that the debate he sparked off had allegedly placed this leadership "at a considerable disadvantage" and provoked "fury among our homegrown militarists."

The very headline of the article published in the Canadian newspaper is quite an eloquent pointer to the nature of the polemics which have now been transferred to the world arena—"Obsolete Soviet Military Might—A Dangerous Source of Harm to the Economy." One of the author's main theses runs as follows: "...we could, without damaging our security, make a radical cut in military expenditures... (in some cases even unilaterally)." Arguments? Here you are. The article includes a table which cites USSR military expenditure figures and quantities of basic types of weapons. It follows from it that the Soviet military budget now stands at \$138 billion.

How this figure was calculated, and what's more in dollars rather than rubles, is kept from the readers. After all, according to the Law "On the USSR's State Budget for 1991" the total sum of defense expenditures was fixed at 70.9 billion rubles [R] (R6.3 billion or 8.2 percent less than in 1989). Like the whole budget, defense appropriations for 1991 have not yet been approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet, but the Ministry of Defense is requesting R5.4 billion less than in 1990 (at 1990 prices). Moreover, this is actually being done unilaterally, without looking over our shoulder at the United States, whose military budget for the same year of 1990 was \$305 billion.

Another thesis developed by the article's author is that our country allegedly has a "considerable advantage in strategic weapons." This claim is also far from the truth and meant for inadequately informed people. The real correlation of forces in terms of strategic nuclear weapons between the USSR and the United States looks like this:

	USSR	USA
ICBM launchers (including MIRVed ICBM's)	1,398(760)	1,000(550)
SLBM launchers (including MIRVed SLBM's)	924(440)	688(656)
Heavy bombers (including those with cruise missiles)	162 (97)	589(289)
Approximate total of charges on strategic delivery vehicles	10,000	14,000-16,000

It can be seen from the table (it has already been cited in our press) that the USSR has a small advantage in the number of strategic delivery vehicles, whereas the United States has superiority in the number of nuclear weapons on strategic delivery vehicles. On the whole, approximate parity is evident. Meanwhile, in order to justify his conclusion, the author has considerably inflated the figures in the table he cites in THE CITIZEN. He indicates, for example, that the Soviet Union apparently has 630 heavy bombers, whereas in reality it has 162. Data for the number of intercontinental missiles, submarines, surface ships, naval aviation aircraft, and the USSR Armed Forces' numerical strength are also overstated. Moreover, G. Arbatov cites facts and figures gleaned by him from "The Military Balance 1989-1990," an annual review published by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, while materials from the Soviet press and USSR Defense Ministry reports are completely ignored.

Why did Academician G. Arbatov find all these tricks necessary? Simply in order to portray himself as the Soviet Union's main and virtually sole champion of the policy of overcoming military danger and of unilateral disarmament. As though cuts of half a million in the Soviet Armed Forces have not actually been made over

the last two years, as though 500 nuclear weapons have not been withdrawn from East Europe and Soviet troops have not been pulled out of there or Mongolia, as though short- and medium-range missiles have not been almost totally destroyed, and as though there was no 18-month moratorium on nuclear explosions.

Omissions of this kind have enabled the author to charge his opponents with being convinced that the "danger of an attack on us by NATO countries and especially the United States" persists, and this, he says, does not correspond to the facts.

However, let us take a look at the real state of affairs. Yes, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, which were signed in Paris, open up real possibilities for changing the political and military situation in this region and create conditions for reducing military danger. However, they have not yet been put into effect. Nor are there practical changes in the NATO military alliance. So far its leaders have only been paying lip service to the policy of reviewing strategy and expanding their bloc's political functions. NATO still remains committed to the "deterrence" concept and the combination of conventional and nuclear forces to ensure "adequate defense."

This is how data for NATO weapons in Europe, compared with the USSR's weapons, look as at November 1990:

	NATO	USSR
Combat aircraft	5,929	6,445
Attack helicopters	1,736	1,330
Tanks	25,051	20,694
Armored combat vehicles	34,666	29,628
Artillery (100 mm caliber or more)	20,620	13,828

It can be seen from the table that NATO troops have superiority over the USSR in most types of weapons. This superiority will become even greater after the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is implemented and will look like this: NATO will have a 1.5:1 advantage in tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery, and a 1.3:1 advantage in combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

It is revealing that Academician G. Arbatov also leaves out of the reckoning the fact that the United States has superior naval forces to ours: 2.6 times the number of large surface ships, absolute superiority in attack aircraft carriers (the United States has 15 and the USSR none), six times the number of carrier-based aircraft, and almost 10 times the number of marines. But when all is said and done, naval forces are acquiring special importance in the solution of Soviet security problems, given

the cuts in ground forces and aviation in Europe. However, because of Washington's opposition, no talks on cutting these forces are being conducted, despite the USSR's repeated proposals.

Everything that Academician G. Arbatov wrote about in Canada's *THE CITIZEN* confirms that he has actually become one of the leaders of the anti-Army campaign in the country, which is being conducted by destructive forces. Nevertheless, having failed to convince the majority of Soviet people of the need for rash unilateral disarmament, he appeals to the West's public in order to enlist support at least there.

Evidently he alone knows the reason for doing all this.

Fifth Anniversary of Gorbachev Plan for Nuclear-Free World Marked

Petrovskiy Views Progress

PM1701153091 Moscow PR117DA in Russian
15 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5

[Article by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy under the rubric "The World and Politics": "Five Years Later: Global Cooperation Instead of Superpower Globalism"]

[Text] It is probably no exaggeration to say that the attention of the whole world is fixed on the Persian Gulf today. We have now gone right up to the 15 January deadline—the day the "peaceful interlude" will end. The course of the crisis's development leaves almost no time for hesitancy, sets its own pace, and forces everyone—politicians, diplomats, the public—to act forcefully. And still the feeling prevails today that the present situation, however dramatic and explosive it may be, differs fundamentally from those conflict situations which arose on several occasions in the past.

The world today is characterized by its striving for global cooperation and rejects both superpower and regional hegemony. But hegemony is being eradicated in strict accordance with the principles of law, which the international community has taken as its yardstick.

Another event is associated with 15 January. Five years ago on this day, M.S. Gorbachev's Statement was published which contained a program to gradually eliminate world stockpiles of nuclear weapons before the end of this century.

In essence this was the first influential document of the new political thinking. The rapid changes in the world which followed in the second half of the eighties confirmed the harmony of the new philosophy in foreign policy with the world transformations whose time had objectively come. The "Cold War" fades into the distance, and with it almost half a century of nuclear antagonism between the two systems.

The question arises, how has the 15 January 1986 statement influenced all these changes? At the moment the program appeared, many of our foreign partners reacted skeptically to it, deciding that it was no more than the next in a series of propagandist actions. In this respect, criticism was most of all elicited by the program's setting out a timetable for the achievement of this or that particular accord. Indeed, experience has made and continues to make amendments in the execution of the complex and multifaceted process of disarmament, with respect to its timetabling amongst other things. But I think the true significance of this document is not in its defining concrete parameters for disarmament, but in its philosophy of a qualitatively new type of international cooperation, global in scope and egalitarian in nature, in an interdependent world.

Perhaps one of the most vital and politically significant aspects of the program are the basic tenets of a conceptually new approach to the problem of security formulated in it. In a period when the process of real disarmament was effectively in the initial stages of its development and deterrence, with arms at extremely high levels, continued to remain a cornerstone in the maintenance of world stability, the Soviet Union came out with a new approach to ensuring global security, and proposed a vision of security as a complex, multifaceted concept, embracing the whole spectrum of military-technical, economic-technical, cultural, and last but not least psychological elements.

In the context of new conceptions of security, the role of force in politics and its place in determining states' political weight and influence in world affairs are seen in a different light. Military force stops being a factor determining the authority and prestige of states, and accordingly the concept of the superpower is eroded, as it is to a significant degree a feature of the outmoded "Cold War."

At the same time, the world community—and, I think, it is necessary to emphasize this—is not afraid of large states, both the existing as well as the nascent ones. On the contrary, people see them more and more as extra guarantors for the integration processes' accelerated development, and for the perfecting of the system of world economic links. Only it is important that they form an integral part of regional and global security structures and, on the other hand, are democratically run—which would create sound guarantees for the nonuse of their great economic and other potential for aggressive purposes.

It is also of note that in the 15 January program attention is paid in particular to questions of safeguarding security not only in Europe but also in Asia. It was at this very time that the Soviet Union's process—which continues to this day—of realizing that it is historically a Eurasian power in the widest geopolitical sense of the term, whose Asian and Pacific foreign policy orientation is just as important as its European one, received a boost.

Finally, talking about this document's significance, you cannot fail to mention perhaps the most important long-term aspect of its influence as much on the development of our foreign policy as on the international situation. Having advanced a thesis of the indivisibility of security and the primacy of nonmilitary methods and means of guaranteeing it, based in the first place on the creation of structures of comprehensive cooperation with all groups of states, the Soviet Union overcame the psychological barrier of closedness thrown up by the "Cold War" and began to move swiftly from its isolationist stance of many years to one of establishing firm international links of the new type.

Disarmament was put onto a practical footing, and is designated in the 15 January program as the main direction for the creation of lasting international security.

The first breakthrough on the road to real nuclear disarmament was the signing and coming into effect of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Its practical implementation, which is in full swing, means the complete destruction of two classes of Soviet and U.S. nuclear missile.

Today we have got right up to the next stage in the building of a nuclear-free world: The agreement on strategic offensive weapons is almost ready for signing. This will be an unprecedented step in the disarmament process. And progress will not stop with this—after the USSR and the United States have concluded the agreement, they intend to continue talks on the further reduction of their offensive nuclear arsenals.

A new stage in the realization of the program of 15 January is beginning, in which other nuclear powers and all other countries of the world should join in with the U.S. and Soviet actions in the field of disarmament. We are talking about the globalization of the process of disarmament, the complementarity of bipartite, regional, and multipartite efforts.

The banning of nuclear tests is a definite priority. The ratification of the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976 in the USSR and the United States, creates preconditions for an actual move forward to the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has sharply reduced the number and yield of its explosions, and is ready to stop them completely on a mutual basis with the United States. The conference taking place during these days on the question of prohibiting nuclear tests, points up a sure way to its resolution by the combined efforts of all states, first and foremost the nuclear ones.

The multipartite, comprehensive approach is also gaining a foothold with regard to the other priority task—that of the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The key element here is

the Non-proliferation Treaty, which should stay in force right up to the complete and final elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons is in its early stages. Talks can and must finish in 1991, having secured an universal character for this most important document.

But it would be a mistake to suppose that the implementation of the program of 15 January is limited to disarmament. Work of no less importance is being carried out in other areas. Significant progress has been made in the solution of regional conflicts using the approved method of searching for a balance of interests, applying the great potential of the United Nations as peacemaker. And today the creation of regional security structures is on the agenda.

It is becoming more and more apparent that as this global cooperation becomes reality, a new world order, based on the necessary recognition of the primacy of common human values and overcoming a split in the world, is forming. I think that the establishment of a new world order is possible only by increasing the role of law in world politics and forming universal international legal bases for the regulation of interstate relations. It seems that this is one of the basic guarantees for a crisis-free evolution of the international community into a rule-of-law community of democratic states, a development which today has received the name "global democratic revolution." In a period when the old military power-based structures of security are being dismantled, and, I will be frank, the system of political and legal restraint supported by verification which is to replace it still has not acquired a clear profile, not only in the practical sphere but also at a conceptual level, a vacuum of stability inevitably forms, which, as the Iraq-Kuwait conflict has demonstrated, the powerful potential of politico-legal influence is called to fill—a potential vested in the UN Charter and coordinated actions by the permanent members of the Security Council. But this is only one level—that of foreign policy—in the layers of legal settlement of international relations. The internal political side of this problem is no less important, inasmuch as the formation of a rule-of-law community of states is only possible if there are developed democratic societies in each of them.

In such conditions as those of the formation of new structures in an interdependent world, the problem of the interconnection of domestic and foreign policy acquires a particular practical significance for us today.

On the one hand, foreign policy facilitates the resolution of domestic policy problems. Through the varied mechanisms and institutions of multifaceted cooperation, we gain access to the world's accumulated scientific knowledge and technological achievements. This can clearly be seen in the field of disarmament. Just a few years ago, we regarded disarmament more as some kind of slogan, divorced from its most complex technical aspects. The

situation changed radically when actual conversion work, the practical implementation of the new defensive doctrine, was launched and the technically complicated task of the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons became fully apparent. It turned out that from the financial point of view too, disarmament makes considerable demands. And here, as they say, we will not make out alone, especially taking into consideration the present economic position of the country.

On the other hand, and this is perhaps the most important thing today, the tendency towards internal destabilization in the Soviet Union and the sharp increase in the tendency for crises to develop in all areas of society—if this cannot be halted—may lead to the elimination of the necessary conditions for conducting a democratic foreign policy. It is not by chance that ever increasingly in the world today, people say that the further development of global cooperation and of positive tendencies in various areas of international cooperation, are linked to the prospects for maintaining the political stability and economic integrity of the Soviet Union.

'Proper Perspective' Seen

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12 Jan 91 Second Edition p. 7

[Article by Boris Pyadyshev, chief editor of MEZH-DUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, under the "View From Moscow" rubric: "A Security Concept Is Needed"]

[Text] Time puts all things in their proper places, assigning final assessments to events, slogans, and plans. This applies fully to the program for a nuclear-free world put forward by the Soviet leadership 15 January 1986. Today, looking back over the five intervening years, it is perceived without the former raptures and superlatives: the inertial (this was at the very beginning of perestroika, after all) clumsiness of the claim to speak in the name of all mankind and on behalf of all mankind can be seen in the program. Some degree of naivete is also perceptible in the desire to stage the ridding of the world of nuclear, chemical, and other mass destruction weapons in phases and in years, concluding this process by the year 2000.

Having made these remarks, which cannot be avoided today, let us also say a word of praise for the program in its jubilee year. Let us start with facts. Today's state of affairs in the sphere of arms limitations coincides surprisingly exactly with ideas which were envisaged for the first stage of the program. For example, it was assumed that the USSR and the United States would halve their strategic nuclear arms within five-eight years, would fully abolish intermediate-range missiles, and movement would begin in the direction of reducing conventional arms and armed forces.

So, there are no more intermediate- and short-range missiles. The most important Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which sharply restricts the

arms levels of states belonging to the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was signed 19 November last year in Paris.

A treaty on a 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States is essentially ready on a political level. All that remains is to finalize agreement on some nonfundamental questions and complete the technical preparation of its text. It can be hoped that this document will also be signed during President G. Bush's visit to Moscow planned for February. Important accords on a new generation of measures aimed at strengthening trust and security in Europe have been achieved.

The disarmament measures of the first stage were carried out fairly elastically, almost on an ad hoc basis. And not because they concerned nonsubstantial issues. No, these were large-scale, drastic measures. But nevertheless these are only the initial approaches to a radical problem: so far only arms which are in superabundance are being reduced. Moreover, only the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers are being subjected to shake-up, and the difficulties which have arisen have been difficulties within the framework of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Matters are different at the second stage of the program, when the remaining nuclear powers are due, according to estimates, to be included in nuclear disarmament. It will be far more difficult to find a common denominator. Will France take this step? Will Britain? China? It is a big question. At any rate up till now these countries have shown no great desire to part with missiles.

Now is an opportune moment to examine the long-term prospects of the program for a nuclear-free world. Our ideal is a mutual rejection of nuclear weapons, an end to testing them, the complete destruction of stockpiles, and guarantees of their not being produced anywhere at all on earth. This was and remains the case. But today it is also clear that this ideal is moving beyond the time boundaries which were drawn up five years ago. More than that, I will venture to say: A completely nuclear-free world is hardly possible, and is even risky for the foreseeable future.

Why impossible? This is more or less clear. Because of the position of other nuclear powers, apart from the USSR. Because of the firm resolve of states like Israel, Iraq, Pakistan, and others to join the nuclear club, on whose threshold they already stand.

So far there is only one way to prevent this—strengthening the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Two more states joined it last year, and the number of this treaty's signatories now stands at 141. This makes the treaty the most universal agreement in the arms limitation sphere in terms of the number of signatories. The problem of nonproliferation, evidently, may take a most unexpected turn as regards our own country. Is it not likely, as foreign circles are gradually beginning to claim, that the USSR will disintegrate into several autonomous states which will "inherit" the Soviet nuclear weapons? A new space of instability and

sharp conflicts would open up, where the use of nuclear weapons, if they were readily available, could be contemplated. This prospect is extremely alarming for foreign politicians. At any rate, this was discussed with great alarm at a prestigious conference on preventing accidental nuclear war held recently in Stockholm.

To continue. Let me explain why a nuclear-free world is in a certain sense risky. In the world community of states, even when there are the most idyllic relations between them, a contingency reserve of security is necessary. A large but civilized "stick" is, if you like, needed to protect the general order against dangerous antics by adventurist regimes. A certain quantity of superweapons are needed for such eventualities. They could remain in the hands of some leading powers. UN nuclear armed forces could be created with this end in view. It is hardly possible to manage without this in the era we are entering, which is even now fraught with a mass of regional conflicts and crises.

The fact that the nuclear arsenal retained as a contingency reserve should be as small as possible is quite another matter. Destabilizing weapons systems, which could only be used to deliver a first, preemptive strike, should be excluded from it. Is it not time, bearing this in mind, to start discussing with Westerners the problem of minimal nuclear deterrence? In the meantime, insisting inflexibly on the ideas of a completely nuclear-free world, we have been avoiding this.

The program of 15 January 1986 inaugurated a conceptual breakthrough in questions of ensuring our national security. Over the decades preceding this landmark, the philosophy of the Soviet military-political leadership amounted to considering military might to be the main means of guaranteeing security. Political means were pushed far into the background. It was also considered that this military might should be sufficient to respond not only to America but also to the whole NATO bloc, to all conceivable opponents in other parts and lands. And, it must be said, we almost achieved strategic parity with the rest of the world. But a terrible price had to be paid for this—the country could not withstand the excessive strain of the arms race.

The program for a nuclear-free world provided the first approaches to shaping a new concept of national security. A gradual switch of efforts began from primarily military ways of achieving this goal to a combination of military and political means with a steadily growing role played by the latter. Open dialogue with the West made it possible to arrive at the fundamentally important mutual statement that the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance, are no longer opponents, and are henceforth prepared to build their relations on the basis of partnership and cooperation.

Of course, some time will inevitably pass before the creation of mechanisms for ensuring security by political means on regional and global levels alike is completed

and they begin to operate fully. During this period military means are called upon to back up the process of ensuring security. They can play their role in conditions of combining efforts to reduce the military threat with consistent practical implementation of the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

Now we are left virtually alone, without the Warsaw bloc, without allies. Our domestic affairs are meanwhile going from bad to worse. Hence the question: How are we to build estimates and plans in the military sphere in these conditions? As we did before, setting our course by the number of missiles and nuclear warheads in the Pentagon's arsenal? I think not. We ourselves must determine, precisely and with great deliberation, what should be the minimum quantity of arms which would guarantee that any aggression against the Soviet Union would result in irreparable damage for its initiator, and at the same time the aim should be to ensure that there is no potential aggressor among the major powers; we must deepen open and normal relations with them.

If we succeed in defining the quantitative and qualitative volumes of arms, proceeding from the principle of a reasonable sufficiency for defense, then is there not an argument for reducing our arsenals to these lower levels ourselves, in the course of our own military building rather than in the process of protracted and agonizing international talks? This would be a reasonable move, dictated by national interests. Incidentally, France was the first to act in this way, beginning back in the sixties to define its own military needs without looking at the strategic plans of other states, but guided by the simple logic of having as many nuclear and other weapons as might be necessary to deter [otvadiť] anyone from attempting to encroach on its security.

Whether or not the fulfillment of the program for a nuclear-free world goes according to the stages projected five years ago is not the most important matter. What is important is that these initiatives of Moscow's play an historic role, giving the disarmament processes a sound fillip. In the present conditions, it is evidently more reliable to proceed from one accord to another, without rigidly stipulating their interlinkage. It is important not to lose the tempo recently gained in the sphere of arms limitation. People are lamenting that, in foreign policy, the coachman is driving the horses too hard. Only someone who has nowhere else to hurry to can talk like that. Sensible people, of course, do not rush at breakneck speed in matters which concern national security, but to check the momentum that has been gained in arms limitation, in the shedding of superfluous and burdensome fat and flabby muscles, would be irrational, both with regard to our military-political interests, and our domestic situation.

Plan Said 'Working Successfully'

*LD1501100691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1243 GMT 14 Jan 91*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 14 January—Tomorrow it will be five years since the announcement by Mikhail Gorbachev of

Soviet Foreign policy set out in the statement of 15 January 1986. The document essentially laid out a strategic course with regard to the West and specific long-term aims in all spheres of disarmament.

Now that a five-year period has elapsed, it is a good idea to consider where the strong aspects of this program lie and why it is working successfully. At the same time, of course, it should be borne in mind that, from the outset, the Soviet disarmament plan was not presented as dogma. The world has changed, we ourselves have changed, and our vision and perception of the world have changed. Naturally, time limits have moved, the plan has been altered and added to, and intermediate stages have been introduced on the path toward the final goals.

First of all, it should be pointed out that the comprehensive nature of the disarmament program has justified itself. Its core is, without doubt, the plan for the elimination of nuclear arms. But at the same time it includes specific proposals for the destruction of chemical weapons, conventional weapons, and so forth. At present, it is clear that the path toward a nuclear-free world lies through deep cuts in armed forces and conventional weapons to the level of reasonable defense sufficiency, a shift toward defensive doctrines, and the formation of a comprehensive international security system. All these elements are interconnected and they must be viewed as an inseparable whole, without regarding more rapid advancement in certain areas as impossible, however. As we see it, it is precisely the comprehensive nature of the Soviet program that has made possible breakthroughs on the path of reducing various weapons—nuclear, chemical and conventional.

The second substantial element in the program which has already displayed its effectiveness in practice, was the gradual approach of arms reductions. Thanks to it, treaties and agreements can be drafted sufficiently quickly, without waiting for a drawing together of positions on all the controversial issues in one sphere of disarmament or another. The sides have rejected the previously widely used approach to talks according to the principle of "either all or nothing." With the conclusion of the INF Treaty a fundamental breakthrough was implemented in interpreting the process of nuclear disarmament, and the first step was taken toward a reduction in nuclear arsenals. The second step will be the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. The start of the talks on tactical nuclear weapons is next.

The third element to which I would like to draw attention is the establishment in the program of temporary frameworks for the achievement of the goals set, that is distinctive schedules for the movement on the talks. Acknowledging that the terms were not realistic throughout, it should for all that be noted that this had a definite influence—in many aspects the movement along the path of disarmament was speeded up.

If one speaks as a whole, it should be stressed that the program drawn up is operating effectively. Practice has shown that the disarmament program is not a Utopia. Both the East and the West are moving away from the fixed patterns of the past, from the stockpiling of an ever increasing quantity of armaments to the achievement of security and stability. Never before the Soviet Union submitted its program were such a large number of such important treaties and agreements successfully concluded.

'Nuclear Angle' of Soviet Union's Breakup Considered

PM2201161191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5

["Observers opinion" by Yevgeniy Shashkov: "Political Herostratoses in the 'Theater of the Absurd' with an Unpredictable Finale"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] As for the West, in my view the governments of the leading countries are well informed about the processes taking place in the Baltics and the Union as a whole. This largely explains their quite restrained attitude toward the various "fronts." "Bush is showing no sympathy for the democratic movements in the Soviet Union. He does not like them..." Martin Coleman, executive director of the American Foundation for the Support of Resistance Movements, believes. Clearly it is thanks to his magnificent intuition, but also perhaps as a result of good information, that the U.S. President drew his own conclusion earlier than many people even in our country: a conclusion similar to the recent admission by the well-known radical A. Sobchak: "...those forces which we call democratic—they are not democratic at all." [passage omitted]

This whole process of sharing out the hide of a living bear is being conducted, as a rule, to the accompaniment of muted discussions that this is the only way the path to true democracy, sovereignty, and freedom can be opened up for the peoples of the Soviet Union. The most surprising thing is that all this is being taken completely seriously not only in the West but in our country, too. I admit that some foreign conservatives would in principle be happy with the "great partition" of the Union: They are hoping to do away with the giant in the East once and for all. But for the entire civilized world community, this would be yet another "small gift." Imagine for a moment: Thirty poor, embittered, dwarf states hysterically screeching about their eternal commitment to democratic values and desperately fighting each other to get at the supplies of Western aid...

But these are merely the "little blossoms." Whereas the "little berries," that will surely make the entire world community sick, come later. It is well known that the USSR, as a major nuclear superpower, is a most important element of the world strategic balance. It is no secret to anyone that, even after the implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles,

many Soviet republics will still be full of nuclear weapons. There are also tactical missiles, nuclear artillery charges, and of course strategic missiles of various basing modes. Even to the uninitiated it is clear what potential danger a country belonging to the "nuclear club" possesses. Recall the alarm sounded in the West when it was reported that a group of thugs in Azerbaijan had tried to capture a nuclear munitions depot near Baku. This unverified fact was immediately included in a report to the European parliament by the Oxford research group on European security problems.

Now let us consider the plan for the "great partition" of the USSR from the nuclear angle. This is not only a subject for the "theater of the absurd," this would fill a whole "horror movie." Here is just one scene from real life, one not even connected with weapons. The despairing workers at Lithuania's Ignalina AES [nuclear electric power station] are ready to declare a strike and leave the station at idling speed. An unpredictable situation could be created. Admittedly, the Baltic Military District's troops will now take the station under their protection if anything happens. But if a situation occurs where they cannot do that or are too late to do it... What will the members of the world community do then, the Scandinavians for example? Just one thing: Pray that the wind doesn't blow in their direction.

Let us take another scenario. In some of the 20-30 independent states to be formed during the "great partition," as the West believes, unpredictable regimes are bound to come to power, sometimes even Iraqi-style dictatorships. To ensure their own security, win prestige, and gain greater influence over those like them, they will surely try to acquire nuclear weapons. I foresee objections: Democratic states will never agree to that. However, it is not only authoritarian regimes suffering from nuclear ambitions today but Israel, too, calling itself a democratic state.

Until recently, such scenes seemed unrealistic to me despite the fact that they were being seriously discussed by Western specialists, including those belonging to the prestigious conference on preventing accidental nuclear war held recently in Stockholm. But after Boris Yeltsin's comments on the possibility of creating a Russian army I realized: Foreign specialists are not discussing topics for a "theater of the absurd" but are modeling a real possibility. I foresee objections: The possible creation of Russian military structures does not mean supplanting the USSR Armed Forces. This is merely a question of some insignificant formations to protect the republic's sovereignty. But such explanations will only satisfy amateurs, those who are unfamiliar with military building, who are unaware of the self-sustaining character of the arms process. But that process, as specialists know, has its own inner logic that neither senates nor parliaments in the West can resist, not to mention certain of our republican Supreme Soviets becoming bogged down in endless discussions. It only needs the first step to be taken.

The world community's entire experience indicates that the "nuclear temptation" is just as difficult to combat as drug addiction. Especially when the nuclear "legacy," for the sake of whose creation all the peoples of the USSR denied themselves the most essential things for almost 20 years, may be handed them as a gift. How can one fail to recall the forecast of former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline: "The problem of a Great Russia with a population of 150 million and armed with nuclear weapons is quite feasible."

The hasty steps to create a Russian army, if taken, will enable the "various armed formations" in the Baltics to institutionalize themselves as national armies on "legitimate" grounds (so long as the center continues to employ the purely epistolary genre). Sundry thugs in Moldova and the Transcaucasus will be able to do the same. Nor, I think, will the Ukrainian Rukh remain aloof from this and especially not the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists], that already has military structures. They are bound to acquire nuclear ambitions if you bear in mind the fact that there is more than enough nuclear "property" in the Ukraine already. In the Caucasus, as already mentioned, such tendencies were noted a year ago.

In the atmosphere of universal chaos, if, God forbid, the "great partition" begins, a special role will be played by the several tens of millions of homeless Russians (including at least 1 million retired officers of various generations) who are being "evicted" from the national republics and whom Russia, rent by fierce political and economic crisis, will have nothing to offer. I am afraid that this gigantic human stratum will be like a cargo that has broken loose in a ship's hold and is crushing everything in its path.

I am bound to mention the attempts at the "creative" transfer of East European scenarios to our land. This demonstrates, in my view, a mental laxity and a poor intellectual potential on the part of those who are doing it. In 1989 and 1990 I witnessed the change of systems in almost all the former socialist countries, some—with all due respect for their national specifics—are comparable in terms of territory, population, and even problems only with Moscow City and Oblast. In a multinational nuclear superpower with its Eurasian mentality, an orientation toward these scenarios leads to tragedy. As for the splitting of the Armed Forces, we have already been through that. The people will not endure two civil wars in one century. There must be fundamentally different and specific paths for the transformation of society.

The last thing I want to do is engage in intimidation or gloomy predictions. Especially now, when the world has entered the final decade of the millennium. And at the junction of two millennia, as the ancients used to say, even the most improbable forecasts come true. These are merely theatrical scenes inspired by the unceasing attempts of our own and foreign political Herostatoses to burn down their own home.

UN Experts Discuss Conventional Arms Sales

LD2201145591 Moscow TASS in English 1305 GMT
22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] New York, U.N. Headquarters, January 22 (TASS)—Openness in the field of international arms sales was discussed at an expert group session that opened here on Monday.

The expert group was established under the U.N. General Assembly session in 1988 to prepare a detailed study of openness. It is expected to be ready this summer and presented by the U.N. secretary-general in a report to the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Experts from 20 countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, Brazil, Egypt and Sri Lanka, are taking part in the session.

They represent foreign and defence ministries, universities and public organisations.

"The central concern of the report we are working on is the way to ensure openness, transparency as the principal confidence-building measure," group coordinator Timur Alasania told TASS.

"Our study proceeded from the need to work out a set of measures helping to eventually reduce international sales of weapons and strengthen security and stability.

"Participants show considerable interest in the linkage between international weapon sales and arms reductions in central Europe. They fear that arms reductions in Europe will release weapons which will end up in Third World countries," Alasania said.

He noted that the Gulf war was providing a sinister backdrop to the conference. The Gulf military conflict highlights the importance of the problem experts are working on and the significance of the report they are preparing.

"Discussions at preceding sessions were sometimes rather abstract in character. However, this conference has already shown that many speakers are now fully aware of the need to take practical steps. This approach reflects the desire of the international community to respond quickly to current events and not to waste precious time."

START TALKS

U.S. ALCM Development Criticized

PM0801111191 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel Yu. Alekseyev: "Air-Launched Cruise Missiles: Search for Options Goes On"]

[Text] Air-launched nuclear missiles appeared as a U.S. strike system on the eve of the 60's. The first weapon of this type—the Hound Dog—was intended for the B-52 strategic bomber. Later the SRAM-A [Short-Range Attack Missile-A] was developed—to pressure air defense systems and ensure the B-52's penetration of enemy airspace. In the mid-seventies the Americans developed the ALCM-A [air-launched cruise missile-A] cruise missile, which, however, did not enter series production—they decided that its range was not long enough. It needed a further \$1.2 billion to bring this idea to fruition. Thus there appeared the ALCM-B cruise missile, with a range of 2,500 km. Some 1,700 of these missiles were produced, costing a further \$2.8 billion.

After that, work went faster. Whereas it took 20 years to replace the first generation of air-launched missiles, the second took just 10 years. Now the creation of the future advanced cruise missile with a range of over 3,500 km is almost complete. Development has cost \$3.6 billion and the production of 1,500 of these missiles will cost \$3.3 billion.

Research is also being conducted in the sphere of tactical aviation. The following option is being planned here: The SRAM-2 that is being developed is to be used as the basis for the creation of a tactical version—the SRAM-T. This is planned for the mid-nineties. Europe has been chosen as the main deployment area.

There is no doubt that none of these Pentagon plans is in keeping with the spirit of the political changes that have begun. But how dangerous are the U.S. military-industrial complex' efforts in this sphere? Their danger is proportionate to how far they undermine what has been achieved during lengthy and complex talks. Was it worth working for the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range ground-launched missiles if the threat is simply switched from the ground to the air? What will be the practical result of the future treaty on strategic offensive weapons if outdated systems are replaced by better and more sophisticated ones?

But, you will object, modernization, just like scientific thought, cannot be stopped. It is hard to dispute that. But that means agreeing to a continuation of the arms race. Is such a moral position? I doubt it.

U.S. Motives for Summit Postponement Viewed

CFE, START Linkage Scored

LD0801143591 Moscow TASS in English 1358 GMT
8 Jan 91

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, January 8 (TASS)—Asked at a recent briefing about the Soviet-U.S. summit, scheduled to be held in Moscow on February 11-13, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said that "at this point" the U.S. was still planning to hold it on the dates announced.

The American spokesman did not rule out the possibility of a postponement for "a couple of concerns", however.

First, the situation in the Persian Gulf and "what might be the status of events there". It is fair to say that on this point the U.S. Administration can be understood to some degree. A question prompts itself, however: Will the significance of personal exchanges of views between the leaders of the two great powers increase even greater if the situation worsens in the Gulf?

In this context, it seems useful to recall the unscheduled, even extraordinary, meeting between the Soviet and U.S. Presidents in Helsinki, held at the request of George Bush to discuss the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Frankly speaking, I cannot understand the other concern cited by Fitzwater: "the status of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations". He said that "we are having some delays in that area".

Admittedly, the negotiators have yet to sort out some of the issues. It turns out that the "delay" was linked to "verification of some of the numbers we were given during CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe talks]", however.

What is the relationship between the talks on strategic armaments in Geneva and Conventional Forces in Europe talks in Vienna? Moreover the CFE treaty allows for three months after its entry into force to settle all contentious issues connected with the provision of information by the sides.

Did Washington really not know about this before agreeing on the date of the summit in Moscow? It is hardly feasible to link different talks, even though they are "a part of the arms control discussion", using Fitzwater's expression.

The previous unfortunate experience of arms control shows that attempts to link different negotiations have never produced positive results. At the same time, the positive experience shows that sides reach agreement quicker when they divide problems and tackle them either concurrently or one after another. An example is the Geneva talks, where at first an agreement on medium and shorter-range missiles was signed and work is now being completed on the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

I think official Washington realises this. Then why the attempt to revive the policy of "linkages" in the run-up to the summit? Perhaps this is a desire to exert political pressure on Moscow or check out if it has changed its policy, carried out in accordance with new political thinking? If this is so, one should say bluntly that the method of pressure will hardly prove effective.

The best place for the president to become convinced of the invariability of the Soviet leadership's policy is the summit meeting.

START Seen Linked to CFE Implementation

PM0801171791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin under the general heading "Summit May Be Postponed"]

[Text] At the time the Moscow edition of IZVESTIYA was signed to press there had been no official reaction by the Soviet side to Fitzwater's speech. Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry information administration, limited himself to the following statement: "The Foreign Ministry continues to work on the basis that the meeting between the Soviet and American presidents will take place, as scheduled, between 11 and 13 February."

In unofficial conversations, however, high-ranking ministry staffers admit that Fitzwater's statement has come as no surprise to them. The domestic political situation in the Soviet Union is the basic reason for this American move. Hinting at a possible postponement of the summit, the Americans give us to understand that it would be a mistake to count on Bush's visit taking place come what may, regardless of the development of the situation in the USSR. It is most likely no accident that the White House press secretary's announcement should be made on the very day when Moscow announced its decision to dispatch assault troop units to the Baltic to back up the Soviet Army draft.

Touching on other reasons for a possible postponement of the visit, a well-informed Foreign Ministry staffer implied that the planned signing of the treaty on strategic arms in Moscow could be frustrated because of problems that have arisen with the other agreement—the Paris agreement on conventional arms in Europe. The Americans and, to an even greater extent, the Europeans have taken umbrage at being given by the Soviet Union, as they see it, distorted data about their armaments due for reduction. "The situation is very serious. Confidence in us has been undermined. I fear that until we work this problem out, no new treaties will be signed with either the United States or the Europeans," my interlocutor said.

As far as the the treaty on strategic offensive arms proper is concerned, all the basic problems there have been solved and it only remains to settle technical details, bound up basically with its translation. If the treaty is not signed on schedule, it will only be because of its linkage with questions that have arisen in connection with the Paris agreement, according to the Soviet diplomat.

Churkin Announces Start of Treaty 'Elaboration'

LD1901160191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1402 GMT 19 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishev and Sergey Ryabkin]

[Text] Moscow, 19 January (TASS)—The Soviet Union and the United States are beginning elaboration of the

strategic offensive weapons treaty. With this aim, according to the agreement achieved, consultations at the deputy foreign ministers level will begin in Washington on 21 January, reported Vitaliy Churkin, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, at a briefing.

"The Soviet side will be represented by Aleksey Obukhov, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, and on the American by Reginald Bartholomew, the under secretary of state, the diplomat said. These consultations will be held with the participation of representatives of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons."

As the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reported, "the aim of these meetings is elaboration of the strategic offensive weapons treaty in light of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit."

Obukhov Optimistic on Prompt Treaty Completion

LD2201000291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2055 GMT 21 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington, 21 January (TASS)—USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksey Obukhov stated in Washington today that in the view of the Soviet side, a treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons could well be ready for signing at the summit meeting in Moscow on 11-13 February this year. A. Obukhov arrived in the U.S. capital for consultations within the scope of preparing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons with U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew. Also taking part in the consultations, which began today at the State Department, are the leaders of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at these talks.

Replying to questions from reporters prior to the meeting, the Soviet representative said that he was "confident" that the unresolved problems could be settled before the summit meeting, and that this most important Soviet-U.S. agreement could be prepared for signing by the presidents of the USSR and the United States.

"We have no major discrepancies," said A. Obukhov, "there remain only technical problems. We are very close to resolving them." According to the head of the Soviet delegation, all remaining problems are fully amenable to settlement, and it will be possible to prepare the final version of the text of a treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons within ten days of settling contentious issues.

Both the U.S. and Soviet sides have claims here. Among them are the issue of the U.S. side's observation and

monitoring of production at Soviet factories engaged in assembling missiles and manufacturing solid fuel for carriers; the USSR's demand for the right to carry out inspections of U.S. factories producing the latest B-2 strategic bombers using "Stealth" technology; and the problem of quantitative limitations on the exchange of telemetric data about missile test launches.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Alternative Uses for Krasnoyarsk Site Suggested

91UM0278A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 15 Jan 91 p 2

["Readers' Letters in Response to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Article Published on 9 October: 'Hitting a Secret Installation With a Sledgehammer'"—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA headline]

[Text] *At the time of publication of Military Observer N. Panyukov's letter "Hitting a Secret Installation With a Sledgehammer," which described the "sad fate" of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station, the editors expressed their willingness to bring proposals for a sensible use of its "remains" out for public discussion. We feel that this topic has touched our readers deeply. We have already received over a 100 letters. We offer some of them to our readers today.*

Stop If It Is Not Too Late

In my line of service, I have been involved in things related to radars for many years. Therefore, it is especially painful for me to read that, because of elementary illiteracy, such horrendous things are being done. Really, it is as they say: There is no limit to human stupidity while its mind is limited. What is it that scared the Americans so much in the Krasnoyarsk radar that our politicians did not have any choice other than to destroy it?

Do we not have enough highly qualified specialists in our country to help the politicians prove to the Americans—currently our friends—that this "secret object," as well as any other radar station, may be used for purposes that are not necessarily of a military nature? This is an irreplaceable base for space, geophysical, astronomical, and many other types of research. Meanwhile, we, without studying the situation in detail, rush to grab the sledgehammer and crush an object into which hundreds of millions of people's money was invested, and which has expensive equipment integrated in it....

V. Matsoshev, Moscow

Why Are Americans Afraid of Us?

Quite possibly, our politicians had been counting on reciprocity. That the Americans would dismantle or mothball their radar stations, at least on the foreign territories—in Greenland and in Great Britain. After all, this is also an ABM treaty violation. Alas! Nothing happened. All American radars continue to operate.

I agree with that 75-years old taiga inhabitant and war veteran, Roman Yegorovich Nebylitsa, who had proposed to turn this radar station into a retransmission station. Perhaps, it can be put to some other use. We should not destroy it, though....

V. Formanchuk, Moscow

To Give the Settlement to the People

I am shaken by what is going on. This is not just a dismantling of a radar station, it is a crime. By profession I am a construction engineer. That is probably why I feel this pain.

I propose that we stop demolishing the structures and conduct negotiations, for instance, with the people who live in the Chernobyl catastrophe area. I am convinced that many will agree to move there. Perhaps from other regions as well. If there is good land there, grazing land, mellifluous meadows for bee-keeping, or fish.... Why not live there? There will always be work for people.

V. Nyavnyko, Skulyany settlement,
SSR Moldova

Perhaps We Should Put Up a Capital There

Judging by your publication, the area where this "miracle on the Yenisey high road" is located is beautiful. And it seems that the settlement is quite modern. With high-rise buildings and comfortable apartments. It is Yenisey, after all. It is Russia itself.

Perhaps, we should start building a new capital of Siberia there?

S. Polyakova, Moscow

What Else Are We Going to Demolish?

I cannot understand: Is it not known to everybody that the radar station by itself does not kill anybody and does not present any threat to other countries? In this sense, Krasnoyarsk Radar Station has nothing to do with anything. It is another matter that its disappearance will make foreign airplanes and missiles invisible to us, and that it strikes another noticeable blow at our already weak economy.

It is easier to demolish that to build.

P. Kulibaba, Pyatigorsk

With the 'Sledgehammer'...at the Fatherland

The problem is that today it is not just the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station on which they use the sledgehammer. They also strike the monuments to V.I. Lenin, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, and S.M. Kirov. These sledgehammers are being used both here and in East Europe. Various turncoats also use the moral "sledgehammer" to strike at our Army, the KGB, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].... They do not give a damn that our security is hurt by this.

Now they have also hit the Warsaw Pact with a "baby sledgehammer." They demand that we close our test

sites while the tests in Nevada continue.... But what about our national security?

A. Kutin, worker, Leningrad

Let This Become an International Scientific Research Institute

I remember how impressed I was when I saw a photo of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station published in a newspaper a year or two ago. I remember thinking: Here is such an expensive, electronic, modern miracle, and it has to be sacrificed for military needs that do not yield any profit for people's economy.

Now it seems there is no military need for Krasnoyarsk Radar Station. Good. But why demolish it? I propose—perhaps, with the participation of foreign experts, as you have mentioned in the postface—to use this grandiose complex to set up a center for UFO observation and research. Then, perhaps, we will figure out jointly who these "strange guests" are and what they want? Perhaps, it will also help us solve our numerous earthly problems. Perhaps, fate itself presents the "Krasnoyarsk object" with such unique chance. Let us think about it.

Yu. Yefstafyev, Leningrad

We thank all our readers who responded to the publication, and invite everybody to continue this discussion, to offer more suggestions. They will be analyzed by a group of specialists who will meet here at our editorial offices in the near future to discuss this important problem.

Our telephone number is 257-25-20.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military section

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shevardnadze Said To Quit Over CFE Tank Dispute

9JUF03041 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRUDA
in Russian 3 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by IAN [News of the Academy of Sciences] Political Commentator Aleksandr Ignatov: "What is Behind Shevardnadze's Resignation?"]

[Text] The threat of a dictatorship and a campaign to discredit Gorbachev's foreign policy course—these are the two main reasons for the unexpected request for resignation which USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze submitted to the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies. How justified are his fears that appeared to some people to be farfetched? And are these two reasons linked?

To answer these questions, we need to relate the history which the foreign press is writing quite a bit about and which our information organs are writing practically nothing about. I have in mind the brilliantly conducted operation to redeploy a powerful military formation to the East, beyond the Urals. Unfortunately, I do not know

the code name of this action whose results were revealed to the world on November 18.

It is precisely on that day that the USSR's official representative to the Vienna Talks on Conventional Arms Reductions in Europe submitted information on the quantity of our military equipment to the partners in accordance with the treaty. And in this remarkable document diplomats and military experts, to their amazement, discovered the disappearance... of 20,000 (!) Soviet tanks.

Is this hard to believe? Let us turn to the pamphlet "The Warsaw Treaty and NATO: Correlation of Forces in Europe" that was published in Moscow in January 1989 by Voenizdat [Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense] and APN [Novosti Press Agency]. The following figures are listed in it about the presence of tanks: The Warsaw Treaty Organization has 59,470 and NATO has 30,690. The ratio is 1.9:1 in favor of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There is also deciphering by country from which it becomes clear that 41,580 of the nearly 60,000 combat vehicles belong to the USSR.

On November 18, General V.M. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna Talks, solemnly handed our information on army strength and equipment quantities to the partners in accordance with the 18-month diplomatic round. The graph titled "USSR's Tanks" totaled 20,694. A simple arithmetic operation allows us to determine that 20,886 vehicles in the Soviet Army have disappeared without a trace during the last 18 months.

This is how the American newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST (December 18) commented on this event: "The Soviet Union has substantially underestimated the number of tanks, armored personnel vehicles, artillery pieces, aircraft, and helicopters subject to elimination under the treaty.... The Soviets declared at least 20,000 guns less than they have at their disposal according to the assessments of Western officials and they incorrectly characterized certain categories of weapons in order to protect them from destruction"....

THE WASHINGTON POST even somewhat played down the scale of the event: In fact, 25,000 (!) guns and 15,500 (!) armored personnel vehicles have also been shipped beyond the Urals....

What have we gained by wasting on this action the very fuel that we do not have enough of during a record harvest, having used those same rail cars which we do not have enough of to transport food and while dooming military equipment to destruction from the harsh climate and impassable roads under the open skies of Siberia?

Soviet participants at the Vienna Talks heard about Operation "Perebrozka" [Redeployment] for the first time from... the Americans when the operation was already nearly over. Ministry of Defense experts began the explanation with the fact there already was not

enough space to garrison military units in the European part of the country. There are neither warehouses nor barracks but there is lots of space in Siberia. That is one.

Two. The latest military equipment from the West was intended to replace old equipment there.

Well and three, the military experts crossed their fingers, we are simply placing tanks and other equipment into storage there beyond the Urals under the open skies and it is no secret at all, having formed some sort of depots instead of military units and formations. Because the fact is that all military equipment that exceeds the "ceiling" set for each treaty participant is being eliminated—cut up, smelted, crushed, or blown up.... For which significant production capacity is required.

All of this is so. But why then not frankly state this to the partners in Vienna prior to, or if worst comes to worst, during the march—deployment to the East? If we admitted our difficulties publicly and honestly, they would believe us a bit more.

"Representatives of the American Department of Defense," wrote that same WASHINGTON POST while carefully selecting the phrase, "expressed fears as a result of the fact that the highest officers of the Soviet Armed Forces, having previously expressed dissatisfaction with this treaty on certain occasions, could decide that they should not strictly comply with it and therefore deceived Soviet diplomats who were responsible for submitting data on weapons."

Incidentally, the promise to eliminate the cannons, tanks, and armored vehicles that were transported beyond the Urals is not a real obligation: The treaty has nothing to do with them at all and an appropriate international inspection team will not be able to inspect them on the spot....

Incidentally, the Vienna documents stipulate that all signatory countries will correct their figures and make them more precise if a discrepancy arises with the truth during the course of the three months prior to February 17. Official Washington has stated: If Moscow does not make such corrections that satisfy the partners, the U.S. Government will not be able to send the treaty to its Senate for ratification.

Here is your first perceptible result of Operation "Perebroska".... But did it in fact become the last straw that sorely tested our Minister of Foreign Affairs' patience?

BUT MAYBE, all of this—is just a not very successful variant of a way out of the numerous real difficulties being experienced by our army? All the more so since the treaty's text legally and formally does not prohibit withdrawal of equipment from its zone of validity prior to the signing of the document.

The political assessment of this step is another matter.

Alas, on November 18, our partners received two more surprises. Three ground forces motorized rifle divisions

suddenly turned out to be part of... the Navy to which the limitations being introduced do not extend. The second surprise consists of a list of announced sites and facilities to be monitored which our experts also submitted to our Western colleagues in accordance with the impending arms reductions. Instead of the 1,500 facilities which we had previously recognized as subject to monitoring, the list totals... 895. As they say, commentary is superfluous.

But maybe our partners are also conducting themselves in this manner? In order to obtain a qualified answer, I turned to V.P. Karpov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration on Disarmament Issues (UPOVR) and a veteran of the negotiations with the United States. "All of the primary information about the army and its weapons is regularly printed in the United States," the diplomat answered me, "and I did not encounter a desire to deceive us during the long years of the negotiating process."

Then maybe the treaty that we concluded in Vienna is simply bad? Viktor Karpov, on the contrary, considers it to be a successful compromise which was very difficult to achieve....

It is important not to sow doubt about our intentions to comply with the treaty and not to undermine that new image of the Soviet Union which was created with such difficulty over the course of a little over five years of perestroika.

No one will believe a second perestroika more. That is why our current attitude toward the Vienna Treaty has such significance. And it is no coincidence that the West is relatively calmly reacting to the withdrawal of troops and equipment from under the treaty's force. An ecumenical scandal would have been created in this regard five years ago or even three years ago. They have begun to believe us and they want to believe us.

When the treaty was signed, it was praised and supported by none other than Marshal D. Yazov. This was natural. Another thing was strange: To hear a contrary opinion from his very mouth a bit later during the work of the 4th Congress of People's Deputies. As far as I know, high officials of the Ministry of Defense also responded negatively to the document at a closed meeting which recently occurred with the editors of military publications. Just where are they speaking the truth—in Paris or in Moscow?

I think that, having encountered the negative consequences of Operation "Perebroska," someone in the army considered it convenient to publicly lay the blame on... E.A. Shevardnadze and his department.

Reports on Arms Movement Seen as 'Sensationalism'

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[Interview with Major General V. Manilov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Information Administration.

and Major General V. Kuklev, first deputy chief of the USSR General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate, by N. Belan, under the rubric "Who Benefits From This"; place and date not given: The Legend of the Vanishing Tanks"]

[Text] The submission of E.A. Shevardnadze's resignation brought forth all sort of stories. If they were to be judged in terms of sensationalism, I would award top prize to one of the last to appear—carried by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 January. The story, narrated in the newspaper by A. Ignatov, is unlikely to be ignored even by people who are already completely fed up with sundry political scandals. Here it goes: A total of 20,886 tanks have "vanished without a trace in the Soviet Army" over the last 18 months. They were there back in January 1989, but had disappeared by 18 November 1990 when the USSR's official representative at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional Armed Forces in Europe supplied our partners with data on the quantity of our combat equipment.

"Spokesmen for the U.S. Defense Department have expressed concern because top officers of the Soviet Armed Forces... have misled the Soviet diplomats responsible for the submission of arms data," according to A. Ignatov's quotation from THE WASHINGTON POST. The author of the news story, entitled "What Is Behind Shevardnadze's Resignation?" goes on to ask: "In actual fact, is it (the journalist means the 'brilliantly executed operation to move eastwards, beyond the Urals' the 'vanished' tanks, guns, and armored combat vehicles) not the last drop which made our foreign minister's cup of patience overflow?"

What sort of intrigues are our military weaving? Could it be that, following last fall's "mysterious troop movements near Moscow," they have decided to undermine our foreign policy course? What is the meaning of all this? This was the topic of a conversation with Major General V. Manilov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Information Administration, and Major General V. Kuklev, first deputy chief of the USSR General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate.

[Manilov] Everyone has the right to make conjectures and put forward his stories. Even the great Montaigne, writing in his "Essays," sounded this warning: "It would be madness to judge what is true and what is false on the basis of what we know." This is because our knowledge is limited. Especially the knowledge of someone who has not studied a given question in depth. This is why I am in favor of an open and honest conversation on all problems of our domestic and foreign political life, provided it is a serious and professional conversation. Dilettantism is capable of exciting public opinion and whipping up passions, but it is not capable of constructively resolving anything.

A professional actually differs from a dilettante in that he does everything possible to get to the heart of any matter.

Look at the story published by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.... Not a bad approach: We are only expressing suppositions, we do not assert anything... I think, however, that any story—especially one that is distributed in millions of copies—must be based on facts. The observer's story does not altogether match them, the reliable facts.

[Kuklev] Let us begin with the main point. There has been no "disappearance" of 20,886 Soviet tanks or any "brilliantly executed operation to move a powerful military grouping eastwards, beyond the Urals" as reported by A. Ignatov. It is well known that our Ground Forces in Europe had 41,580 tanks as at 1 July 1988, and 20,694 as at 19 November 1990....

[Belan] What happened to the remaining combat vehicles?

[Manilov] We adopted a new defensive doctrine in 1987 and, contrary to the skeptics' assertions, started implementing it. This was done not on instructions from the partners in the West but out of our own good will. We were driven by the goal to bury the "cold war," dispel the enemy image, and gain trust. Thus, the first and main element in the new doctrine's implementation was the transformation of our troops' offensive structures into defensive ones. The operational maneuver groups—the so-called "tank fists"—were eliminated. Motorized rifle divisions in Europe lost 40 percent of their tanks, and tank divisions lost 20 percent of theirs. A proportion of tank combined units and regiments were disbanded. Consequently, the total tank pool in Europe was reduced by approximately 10,000 units.

To continue: More than 10,000 tanks were withdrawn from the effective combat strength of our troops in Europe when we adopted the decision to reduce the Armed Forces by 500,000 men—and this was also done at our own initiative, unilaterally. This was yet another demonstration of our good will, an implementation of new political thinking. We demanded nothing of our partners in reply. This was done—it is very important to emphasize this—even before agreement was reached on the categories of conventional arms to come under the treaty's effect.

There you have them, the 20,000-odd "vanished" tanks.

[Belan] They were withdrawn, but what happened afterwards?

[Kuklev] This is well known. Some 8,000 were handed over to troops in the east of the country either to bring them up to establishment strength or to replace old model tanks. There were 8,392 vehicles sited in storage bases in West Siberia and Central Asia. The remainder were written off—either broken down for scrap or converted into national economic equipment, mainly in the European part of the USSR. Exactly the same applies to combat aircraft, strike helicopters, artillery, and armored combat vehicles.

Let me add that there are plans to decommission 6,000 obsolete tanks from troops in the east of the country in 1991-1995, which will be destroyed either by being broken down for scrap or by being converted into national economic equipment.

[Belan] You said that all this is well known. But the article in question hints at exactly the opposite.

[Manilov] This is obviously the whole point of the article. First, even supposing that attempts had been made to conceal the movement of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, and so on—which is absurd in itself—this would have been impossible to achieve because technical intelligence gathering systems make it possible to detect and monitor all movements of arms and equipment. Second, we never made a secret of the fact—and this was repeatedly declared in conversations with representatives of the United States, France, Britain, the FRG, and other states—that the troops and arms being withdrawn from Europe would be sited wherever we deemed it necessary, in other words wherever the appropriate facilities were available. After all, the Americans for example are doing exactly the same— withdrawing their equipment and sending it to, say, Turkey or the Near East.

According to data at my disposal (as at 23 November 1990), the United States transferred 1,270 tanks from the European zone (to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, Oman, Bahrain). A further 1,000 tanks are being moved from Europe to Saudi Arabia. A total of some 3,000 tanks are being withdrawn from the reductions zone without any checks [beskontrolno]. The NATO leadership intends to move to Turkey (to Southeast Anatolia, which is outside the reductions zone) about 1,000 "Leopard" tanks and a large quantity of other arms. The objective is to keep the entire Near East under NATO control. Even Turkey is withdrawing its own "tank surplus" (more than 300 vehicles) from the reductions zone to the country's southeast region under the pretext of ensuring the safety of its borders with Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Everything I have mentioned is being done after the treaty was signed, and this is unacceptable in principle.

Third, the withdrawal of equipment from the zone of the treaty's effect is not legally prohibited prior to the treaty's being signed. It is obvious, however, that the logic of the story he is putting forward prompts him to present this as sedition.

So, of what is the story's author trying to accuse us? Of having committed what sins? Of having deceived not only our partners but even our own diplomats? It would be naive to imagine that the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry would each be playing its own "hand." By the way, E.A. Shevardnadze said the following in this context in one of his interviews: "At the talks on disarmament questions, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, and other departments represent the country's single foreign policy complex. There are arguments at the

stage when positions for the talks are elaborated, but this is normal, in the same way that criticism in the course of legislative debates is normal. Both are guarantees not simply of the correctness of our positions, but primarily of the country's security." You must agree that there is nothing further to be added.

The story's author asks what has been gained by, as he says, the consumption of fuel on the transportation of equipment—fuel which was in such short supply while the bumper harvest was being brought in, by taking up rail cars which are so badly needed for the transportation of foodstuffs, and by condemning, as he puts it, combat equipment to perish from the harsh climate and rough terrain beneath Siberia's open skies?

Let me reply. The equipment was transported in 1989-1990, and thus it is useless to make references to harvest work. It was transported primarily by rail. What was gained? The following, if nothing else: We did away with shortfalls in establishment strength and replaced obsolete equipment models—this took care of 8,000 tanks, 11,200 armored combat vehicles, 600 combat aircraft, and 1,610 artillery systems. Furthermore, this made it possible to substantially reduce military production. Finally, is there any need to talk of the importance of creating a combat equipment reserve? It is, of course, necessary to take care of its proper storage, but this is already a different matter.

Let me say by the way that anyone who is even slightly informed would laugh at the idea of a military grouping having supposedly been moved beyond the Urals. Nobody intends to create any such grouping there on the basis of redeployed arms. The actual term—grouping—implies much more than just equipment alone.

[Kuklev] Incidentally, in order to reach the levels envisaged by the Paris treaty within three years, the Soviet Union will have to eliminate more than 19,000 units of arms and equipment. We have the right to convert more than 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles for national economic purposes.

The volume of cutbacks for all NATO countries amounts to 16,000 units of arms, including about 2,300 for the United States. This will not affect U.S. arms stockpiles on U.S. territory, at its bases on foreign territories, and in the Persian Gulf zone.

One more point. Taking into account the processes now under way within the Warsaw Pact Organization and the forthcoming change of this alliance's nature, primarily of its military organization, comparisons of Armed Forces are increasingly often drawn between the USSR and NATO, rather than between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. As a result of the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the proportion will be 1:1.5 in tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery, and 1:1.3 in combat aircraft and strike helicopters. But this overall proportion, which is to the West's advantage on the whole, is not at odds with the

criterion of minimum sufficiency for our defense. But this must be borne in mind in order to prevent any lagging behind in the quality of arms.

[Manilov] One of the arguments used to prove the "perfidy" of the military concerns the list of published sites and facilities subject to verification. "Instead of 1,500 facilities subject to verification and accepted by us previously, the list contains only... 895. Any comment would be superfluous, as the saying goes," A. Ignatov writes.

I would comment nonetheless. This figure—1,500 facilities subject to verification—appeared long before the treaty was signed, at a time when even the categories of Armed Forces subject to reductions had not been finally agreed. For example, it also covered units comprising only personnel, whose numerical strength had been slated for reduction. Furthermore, some facilities were eliminated as a result of the unilateral cutbacks and withdrawal of our troops from East European countries. We approved an organization and manpower structure, as a result of which some auxiliary units lost some arms (mainly armored personnel carriers) which would have been restricted by the treaty, even though there were not too many such units involved. Thus the quantity of facilities subject to verification provided by us is fully in line with the treaty's provisions. This is all, without any "surprises."

I do not know why the journalist had to interpret the speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, during the work of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies as being at odds with the opinion expressed by him when the treaty was signed in Paris. He evidently means the minister's statement that not all countries enjoy equal representation from the viewpoint of rights and obligations. For example, we have those 895 facilities subject to verification in our country against not a single one on U.S. territory. During the first 44 months they will conduct more than 600 inspections in our country, to be followed by 130 or more each year thereafter, but what about us? Does this assertion contradict the high appraisal of the treaty?

I find totally incomprehensible the observer's supposition that "having come up against the negative consequences of Operation 'Transfer,' someone in the Army found it convenient to publicly shift the blame onto... E.A. Shevardnadze and his department." After all, there is not a single fact to support such a conclusion, while the facts on which the story is built do not stand up to the slightest criticism.

Yes, everyone has the right to openly express his opinion, and probably even to make guesses. But by the same criterion, everyone should bear responsibility for what he says.

Chervov on Soviet Tank Redeployment Behind Urals

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8 Jan 91 p 4*

[Interview with Nikolay Chervov, deputy commander of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Yuriy Lebedev; place and date not given: "Where Did the Tanks Disappear"]

[Text] [Lebedev] How would you comment on the report in the Western press that Soviet weapons have been moved behind the Urals?

[Chervov] Western representatives should not be disquieted by this problem. In connection with this question, the Western press artificially creates an atmosphere of mistrust toward the USSR. First, Minister Eduard Shevardnadze informed Secretary of State J. Baker about the matter in September and, once again, in October 1990. This means that the United States and its allies knew about the movement before the treaty was signed. Military technology was moved behind the Urals outside the framework of the Vienna talks and in this matter we do not feel bound by any commitments arising from the treaty.

Second, the United States itself, and other NATO countries as well, are moving their weapons and technology into other regions. According to available data, as of 23 November 1990 the United States had moved 1,270 tanks from the European zone to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, Oman, and Bahrain. And now another 1,000 tanks are being moved to Saudi Arabia. A total of 3,000 tanks will be moved, without control, from the zone of reduction.

The NATO leadership is going to move some 1,000 Leopard tanks and a large amount of other weaponry to Turkey—South East Anatolia region, outside the zone of reduction. The goal of this transfer is to keep the Middle East under the control of NATO. Even Turkey is moving its "surplus of tanks"—more than 330 tanks—from the zone of reduction to the South East part of the country under the pretext of securing its borders with Iran, Syria, and Iraq. All I have said here is done after the signing of the treaty, which is unacceptable as a matter of principle.

[Lebedev] Let us return to the subject of the transfer of the Soviet military equipment behind the Urals, specifically the tanks.

[Chervov] As of 1 July 1988, we had about 41,500 tanks in our ground forces deployed in the European part of the USSR and we reported it. As of 19 November 1990, that is, at the date of signing the treaty, 21,000 tanks were left in the European part. The difference was approximately 20,500 tanks. Where did they go? A total of 4,100 tanks were scrapped and transformed into auxiliary technology. A total of 16,400 tanks, mostly modern makes, were moved behind the Urals. Of this, 8,000 tanks were given to the troops in the East as a

replacement for older tanks and 8,400 tanks were moved to military depots. A total of 6,000 tanks are to be taken out of service in the east of the country in 1991 to 1995. They will be destroyed by being scrapped, or rebuilt as machines for use in the national economy.

The transfer of a large amount of weaponry behind the Urals can be explained as follows: First, in the years 1988 to 1990 the USSR unilaterally reduced military troops by 500,000 persons, 10,000 tanks, and 8,500 artillery systems and, at present, Soviet troops are withdrawing from Eastern Europe. Second, since 1991 the routine supplies of tanks and other weaponry to ground troops were reduced drastically. By establishing certain reserves of military technology on bases in the East, it will be possible, to a certain degree, to cope with the problem of the replacement of obsolete military technology.

I am of the opinion that no violation of the treaty has taken place here. It would be unreasonable to throw away new machines and keep old ones. NATO countries do the same.

There is another thing that is important today: to reach the level of arms assigned, according to the treaty, to individual groups of countries or individual countries. No faux pas can be made here, since everything will be controlled: initial data, exact numbers after the ratification, the process of reduction (place of liquidation and transformation, place of permanent storage), and the final level of arms during the validity of the treaty. There is some inspection going on in the European part of the USSR almost every day. Is it possible to hide anything under such conditions?

All objects will be checked and there is no question of any speculation on this subject. In my opinion, by spreading various truths and untruths the representatives of NATO would like to increase the number of our objects and thus the number of inspections that we will have to accept. The USSR is firmly sticking to the treaty.

Pros, Cons of CFE Treaty Debated

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[Unattributed interview under "For and Against" rubric with Candidate of Juridical Sciences V. Shkoda and Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Litov; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are introduction: "Will the Paris Treaty Strengthen Our Security?"]

[Text] In response to numerous requests from readers we are starting a new rubric, under which academics, experts, politicians, and public figures will express their views, sometimes at variance with the official view, on upcoming major events in the country's life. Foreign experience shows that by increasing public interest and stimulating constructive polemics, this form of comparison of different opinions has a beneficial effect on the

adoption of correct decisions that take into account all aspects and "pitfalls" of the problems under consideration.

Today's topic is the USSR Supreme Soviet's upcoming discussion and ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] concluded late last year in Paris. International affairs experts Candidate of Juridical Sciences V. Shkoda and Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Litov offer their views on the document.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Statements by many politicians and commentaries by journalists describe the treaty as an unprecedented and even momentous event whose implementation will effectively rule out the possibility of a surprise attack or large-scale military operations in Europe. It is also claimed that the military functions of the two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—will lose their significance, and the strategic doctrines that have held sway for 40 years will cease to have any meaning. Do you accept this view?

[Shkoda] Absolutely. The envisaged exchange of military information and the all-pervading verification will "illuminate" military activity so much that it will be practically impossible to circumvent the treaty or secretly prepare for aggression. In terms of its content and ideological direction, the treaty is essentially a multilateral nonaggression pact. When you consider the sharp reduction in the offensive potential of all sides, it becomes clear that there has been a radical change in the situation in favor of a final abandonment of military confrontation. The only thing I cannot accept is the thesis that strategic doctrines have lost their significance. Alas, since the Paris summit the NATO bloc leaders have confirmed their adherence to the patently obsolete concept of "deterrence" and reliance on a combination of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. At the end of December the North Atlantic countries' state and government heads advocated a "strong and dynamic NATO" and stressed that the main threat still comes from the East, to be precise, from the "unstable" situation there. But one should not expect too much of them: It is difficult to abandon obsolete dogmas straightaway, at a stroke. Let us be patient and keep cool.

[Litov] You see, the West is approaching the disarmament process and the changing of strategic doctrines gradually and cautiously, pondering each step and chewing it over. We, however, are sometimes hasty, we rush into it, getting carried away by the idea of the "momentous" and "unprecedented"; then, when we have blundered, we start to lament: What have we done? The same could happen now: According to the treaty, we are supposed to effect much greater arms reductions than the NATO countries—19,000 units, compared with only 375 for the United States... Obviously, the U.S. Army's main force is much farther from Europe, nonetheless a more than fortyfold (!!!) disproportion in its favor is more like unilateral disarmament than mutually binding accords. And what does it mean: "a surprise attack is ruled out"? So one that is planned and announced is

quite acceptable? Furthermore, once all the intended cuts have been made, the two sides will each have 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, and so on. More than enough for major combat actions, if, God forbid, they begin. Yes, the treaty is a major event, but I would not agree with the superlatives and unalloyed praise expressed both in the question and in my opponent's answer.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] But that is the general tone of the commentaries. It is believed that the treaty does not infringe upon anyone's interests, that it guarantees equal security for all the sides.

[Shkoda] Generally, speaking, I agree with this. But I have some reservations. In any major venture, if one wants to succeed, it is essential sometimes to take a risk, a justified one, of course. Our diplomats have done that. The thing is that the Warsaw Pact has always had more ground forces than the West and NATO has always had a bigger naval force than us. But since the one balanced out the other there was approximate equality. However, in Paris we agreed to defer the issue of reducing naval forces on the understanding that the West, chiefly the United States, would embark on such a reduction in the future. Furthermore, although our country, in view of its size and its position in the world, has been given the highest national ceilings—33.3 percent for tanks, 34.3 percent for artillery, and so on, the balance of forces has effectively changed in NATO's favor, since the Warsaw Pact has broken up and some of its former members have even stated their wish to join the North Atlantic bloc. As a result NATO will now have an advantage over the Soviet Union of 1.5:1 in terms of tanks and armored combat vehicles, 1.3-1.5:1 in terms of artillery, and 1.3:1 in terms of combat and attack helicopters. From the traditional, quantitative viewpoint **equal** security no longer exists: The situation has changed sharply in the West's favor. But, in the first place, we still have quite enough forces and means for effective defensive actions, and, second and most important, the situation must be viewed in the light of the new realities of growing collaboration and mutual trust on the continent.

I would also challenge my colleague on the question of our unilateral concessions. Our diplomats also had considerable success. For instance, the military potential of united Germany has been halved and the treaty includes combat aircraft and light tanks, which the United States and NATO also objected to. There were other concessions on their part. Although, I repeat, one cannot deny that there was a degree of risk on our part. But this is better than the ingrained simplistic and dogmatic approach of diplomacy in the Brezhnev era, which often simply marked time.

[Litov] The SALT I and SALT II Treaties, the dozens of Soviet-American accords, and the Helsinki agreements—is that what you call "marking time"? We believe that we flatter ourselves by vilifying our predecessors. In fact, it is ourselves we harm by engaging in self-deception and ignoring the bitter lessons of the past.

You will recall that there was a new bout of cold war, a new round of the arms race after Helsinki. Even now the situation could change. My opponent admitted himself that for all the mutual concessions in the Paris treaty, it marked a clear departure from the principle of equal security which, at the very least, had sustained peace in Europe, and indeed throughout the world, for several decades. But will it remain in conditions where the West, or, rather, the United States, has an overwhelming advantage and, of course, is really tempted to use it for selfish political purposes? Unlike us, the United States does not hesitate to use military force if it considers it necessary, and not once has it expressed any regrets in Congress or in the government. Grenada, Panama, Iraq too—these are the recent examples; how many have there been since the war! And I am not exaggerating at all when I talk about an overwhelming advantage. It is no secret that the West has superiority in terms of many qualitative components of modern armaments, and, therefore, our quantitative advantage largely offsets the qualitative advantage. One NATO tank crew of professional soldiers is equivalent to two or three of our "amateur" crews. So simple arithmetic is totally inapplicable here. Particularly in conditions where nuclear weapons are being modernized and new and even more terrible types of mass destruction weapons are being created, which, unfortunately, is something the West will not stop doing. But there is more to it even than this. The Warsaw Pact has practically ceased to exist, yet the Paris document follows the old practice and talks in terms of confrontation between two blocs. Why, one wonders, should one deceive oneself, particularly in such an important matter as the country's security? Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Bulgaria have started training their officers in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. The army of the former GDR has simply become part of NATO, together with our weapons, incidentally! The Paris agreements do indeed give us the highest national ceiling—33 percent. But against whom is the remaining 67 percent directed?

[Shkoda] As a lawyer I am bound to agree that the enshrinement in the Paris Treaty of a NATO-Warsaw Pact approach which effectively no longer exists does in many respects devalue the document. For all my respect for the Foreign Ministry leaders, I am forced to admit that they have clearly been hasty to some extent. We have become accustomed to timing everything to coincide with significant dates and important visits, something, incidentally, which no experienced diplomatic service in the world will allow itself. But in general the treaty is necessary, and it is possible to get out of this situation, which, to be frank, is no adornment to our diplomacy, by say, making reservations during ratification or by an appropriate statement by the Supreme Soviet. This is common in the practice of foreign parliaments. On the whole, however, the treaty does make it possible to bring the European process into line with modern realities and provide it with qualitatively new impetus and incentives. As far as miscalculations are concerned, I would not blame the Foreign Ministry for

everything. Talks, as is well known, are conducted with the knowledge and participation of the military. They could after all have stood up for our security interests more energetically and not fawned upon the top political leadership, rather than noisily sounding the alarm in the Supreme Soviet and at the Congress of People's Deputies when the boat had already left...

[Litov] Let us not be naive. Ultimately the timetable and specific terms of international agreements are determined by the Foreign Ministry on the basis of directives from the political leadership. But the directives have to be implemented intelligently. Without making a sensational, ostentatious fuss or displaying personal ambition, which only impede matters. I am talking about the specific terms and timetables here and also have no doubt that the treaty is essential, the problem is its specific implementation, which does, to be frank, leave something to be desired. And the military at the talks, as far as I can judge, perform merely consultative functions and their stances are sometimes disregarded, particularly in conditions of openly cultivated contempt for the Army. The military can come out against the adopted decisions only by going into opposition to the government. In practical terms this means resigning in protest, which in our country, as opposed to the United States, is not done. Sometimes that is the only way that attention can be drawn to the impairment of national security. And it is left to Colonels Alksnis and Petrushenko to protest, but now in the role of people's deputies in the Supreme Soviet. So irony at the belated fuss in parliament is misplaced, in my opinion.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] You have touched on an interesting subject. Regarding this I would like to hear your assessment of the reports in our central press claiming that during the talks in Vienna, where all the work on the treaty was done, our military men substantially understated the number of tanks and armored transports, undermining our Western partners' confidence in our information, which—as KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (3 January) put it—was the "last straw for our foreign minister."

[Litov] You have confused cause and effect. Judge for yourself. In early 1989 we had 41,000 tanks in Europe, and under the Paris Treaty there are to be just 13,000 left in three years' time. This sharp cutback—which is probably unprecedented in history and is naturally very painful if not catastrophic for the Armed Forces—was brought about by the Foreign Ministry's desire to draw up a treaty ready for signing as quickly as possible and preferably before the Paris meeting. When things are being rushed to such an extent, many consequences are overlooked or not taken into account, which results in colossal losses and enormous problems for servicemen, as well as suffering for tens of thousands of people. It was not enough that the planned treaty dealt an extremely hard blow to our tank troops—the basis of the Ground Forces' strike power—it was planned to further eliminate a huge amount of military hardware with correspondingly huge costs, which our economy simply could

not bear. So the military, in an effort to rectify, if only slightly, the mistakes made by diplomats, organized the swift transfer beyond the Urals of thousands of tanks, guns, and other equipment—at least there it would not have to be destroyed. It is unfortunate, of course, that all this coincided with a record harvest, occupying badly needed rail cars and making the job of transport more difficult. But who was to blame for that? First and foremost the Foreign Ministry, which was rushing full steam ahead toward a treaty. Nothing terrible would have happened if its signing had been postponed by 18 months or two years so as to allow the necessary preparations for the arms cuts. Sometimes it is useful to stop, think, and look ahead, assessing the long-term consequences of decisions.

[Shkoda] I would not be so categorical in my assessment. Of course, greater glasnost and openness should have been ensured at the talks; our partners' confidence is an important thing. But the Americans were well aware of our transfers and did not particularly protest. The desire for cheap sensations, to which we have become susceptible, probably played its part here. I cannot agree with my opponent's allegation regarding the timetable. The Vienna talks had lasted more than 14 years. Eventually it was going to be necessary to get down to concrete decisions. And politically the time was exceptionally opportune—if things had been delayed another few years there is no knowing what might have happened. Although I must admit that our Foreign Ministry is still far from embracing real openness and glasnost. At the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, for instance, E.A. Shevardnadze accused the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of unexpectedly and deliberately organizing a discussion of the question of German unification at the Supreme Soviet session. In actual fact this question had arisen for quite different reasons—I was present at its discussion and therefore I can say this with complete authority. The Supreme Soviet members were indignant, and rightly so, about the fact that the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with the former GDR was submitted to them for annulment just a few hours before the two Germanys united. Yet the date for unification had been known at least a few months before. This, unfortunately, is by no means an isolated example of a certain arrogance and lack of respect toward people's deputies.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Looking at the treaty, we cannot ignore the impact the arms cuts could have on our economy...

[Shkoda] Yes, we have gained an opportunity to use considerable material and intellectual resources for the public good. And the hardware to be reduced is no hindrance. Thus, under the treaty we gained the right to convert 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles for national economic purposes. Moreover, in the Asian part of the country several thousand tanks and armored vehicles will be scrapped and turned into auxiliary

technical systems—tractor units, fire engines, and simulators. Although all this will, naturally, involve difficulties.

[Litov] Indeed, we cannot deny that there will be a certain economic effect from the conversion of military hardware. But on the whole we will find that there are far more "minuses" than "pluses." For instance, it is planned to destroy 7,000 tanks, 9,000 armored vehicles, and so forth. This will require considerable expenditures. As for the potential benefits of conversion from military production, my opponent is following the Foreign Ministry example in this area by getting euphoric. According to U.S. figures, conversion will generally be a loss-maker for the first 5-10 years. Many, many billions will have to be invested in it before the desired returns are achieved. It is no accident that the United States is cutting military production with such reluctance. And where it is embarking on such cuts it is doing so at a slow pace, without permitting sharp slumps. "We are not so rich," a U.S. specialist told me, "that we can afford to disarm at a hasty rate."

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] And in conclusion. What would you recommend to the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet who are starting to discuss the treaty?

[Litov] To show character and refuse to ratify a treaty which clearly infringes our security and is economically misguided. To instruct the Foreign Ministry to start talks on reviewing a number of the treaty's provisions—which is something that does happen in international practice. It is high time to give priority to national rather than "global" interests, as all civilized countries do. Naturally, there will be great dissatisfaction, but we can get over it. You'll see, we will be respected more and taken account of more too. After all, even with the sharp drop in our international prestige, we are still a great power. When the U.S. Congress considered that the SALT II Treaty was not advantageous for the country, it refused to ratify it without worrying in the slightest about what Moscow, Beijing, or other capitals would say... Now, in my opinion, we need to think more and consider everything scrupulously. Let future generations judge just how "epoch-making" and "historic" our foreign policy achievements are.

[Shkoda] While sharing my colleague's emotions, I would advise people's deputies to be guided above all by reason and an understanding of prevailing realities. A refusal to ratify the Paris Treaty would delay perestroika processes not only in Europe but worldwide and would make our relations with the Western powers much worse. You will agree that under the present circumstances this could have unpleasant consequences, not least economic... Of course, our diplomats should draw conclusions and take a more sober attitude to their activity. But, on the whole, the Paris Treaty is in line with our national interests and does not infringe the country's security. At the same time, as I have already said, ratification should be accompanied by a number of statements taking account of the recent changes in the

situation in Europe. We need to go forward rather than backward on the basis that our potential enemies have gained an advantage. Are they our enemies? The acceleration of the transition to cooperation and partnership relations is not wishful thinking but a real fact that has to be taken into account.

Chervov Defends Soviet Observance of CFE Treaty

*PM1601150491 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English 9 Jan 91*

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, aide to the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by correspondent Yuriy Lebedev; place and date not given: "General Chervov on Verification and Claims That the USSR Is 'Cheating'"]

[Text] [Lebedev] How do you react to the spate of reports in the Western media on the redeployment of Soviet arms behind the Urals?

[Chervov] The West should not worry about it at all. The Western press has been artificially creating an atmosphere of mistrust towards the Soviet Union in this particular area.

Firstly, in September and October of 1990 Eduard Shevardnadze informed Secretary of State Baker of the removal of tanks behind the Urals. Both the US and its allies know it even before they signed the treaty. That is, the removal of tanks to the areas behind the Urals was done outside of the framework of the Vienna negotiations and we do not think that we have any contractual obligations in this area.

Second, the US and other NATO members have redeployed armaments and materiel to Europe and other regions. According to my information, as of November 23 1990, the US had moved as many as 1,270 tanks from Europe to such countries as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, Oman and Bahrain. Another 1,000 tanks or so are being lifted from Europe to Saudi Arabia. All told, about 3,000 tanks are being removed from the reduction area, this without any control by other parties.

The NATO management intend to transport to Turkey (the South-East of Anatolia is beyond the reduction area) about 1,000 Leopard tanks and a lot of other armaments. The idea is to keep the entire Middle East under NATO control. Even Turkey is removing its surplus tanks (over 330 vehicles) from the reduction zone to its South-Eastern parts under the pretext of security requirements at its borders with Iran, Syria and Iraq. This is being done while the treaty has been signed, which is unacceptable in concept.

[Lebedev] Yes, but would you please comment on the redeployment of Soviet arms, specifically tanks, beyond the Urals?

[Chervov] As of July 1 1988 we had about 41,500 tanks in the land forces in Europe, just as we announced. As of November 19 1990, the day when the treaty was signed, we had about 21,000 tanks left in Europe.

This is what happened to the other 20,500 tanks: 4,100 had been written off as scrap metal and remade into auxiliary vehicles. 16,400 tanks, most of them of the recent makes, had been redeployed behind the Urals. Of them 8,000 had been transferred to the army units in the Eastern parts of the USSR to provide complete sets of equipment or replace older makes. The plans for 1991-95 include the removal of 6,000 obsolete tanks in the Eastern parts of the USSR. Such tanks will either be reduced to scrap or re-equipped into civilian vehicles.

The removal of a large amount of arms behind the Urals should be attributed in the first place to the fact that in 1988-1990 the USSR unilaterally reduced 500,000 personnel, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces and withdrew troops from Eastern Europe.

Second, as of 1991 batch deliveries of tanks and other arms have been slashed to the land forces. The reserve in the Eastern parts may be a way of replacing materiel with expiring service-life. I don't think there is any violation involved. It would have made no sense to reduce new machines while leaving the older ones in the army. The NATO nations are doing the same thing as we do.

The point now is to reach the arms ceilings provided for by the treaty for every group of nations and for every individual country. No deception is possible for there will be strict inspection regarding original data, number for the after the ratification period, reduction procedure (sites for elimination and re-equipment, sites for permanent storage in depots), final levels for the entire duration of the treaty. (We are seeking confirmation of this sentence IAN note). There will be inspections almost on a daily basis in the European part of the USSR. Is there any way of hiding anything in that situation?

[Lebedev] Why do we have fewer verification installations now (as of the moment when the treaty was signed) as compared to what we announced earlier?

[Chervov] Life goes on, and changes have occurred in the structure of our armed forces and in the number of verification installations. There was no clear definition of 'verification installation' before the treaty was elaborated. Their number has gone down for the following reasons:

Facilities that have personnel but no arms or materiel to be reduced under the treaty are not subject to count:

A number of large units and units have been unilaterally disbanded, including a guard tank division that has been 'lost' by the West, plus a number of units have been removed from the reduction area.

Not subject to count are higher education establishments (about 70 per cent) that have 30 or fewer arms or

materiel to be reduced under the treaty or less than 12 pieces of any one category of armaments (this conforms to the treaty);

Not subject to count are a number of facilities because their organic armaments and materiel have been excluded by the treaty from the list of arms or materiel to be reduced under the treaty. All such facilities shall be under supervision, and no cheating is possible. I think that NATO spokesmen want to increase the number of our facilities by hook or by crook, and therefore the quota of the inspection parties that we will have to receive. The USSR acts in strict accordance with the treaty.

Soviet, FRG Legislators View Troop Withdrawal

LD1501093791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 14 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kalintsev]

[Text] Bonn, 14 January (TASS) - Issues connected with the stationing of Soviet troops on German territory and their withdrawal were the focus of attention at a meeting of Soviet and German legislators held in Bonn today. The Soviet delegation, which is making a tour of a number of European countries, is headed by Leonid Sharin, acting chairman of the Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Replying to journalists' questions after the meeting, Sharin stated that the legislators of the two countries had discussed ways of fulfilling the treaties and agreements connected with the stationing and withdrawal of Soviet troops. Many problems have not yet been resolved, he said, particularly concerning the timing of the withdrawal of troops, property issues, and relations with the local population. We would like to involve the German side in the resolution of the problem of transit across Poland, because the Polish authorities are placing obstacles in the way of the transit of our troops from Germany to the USSR, he asserted. We drew the attention of our interlocutors to the unlawfulness of the FRG's actions toward persons who have deserted from units of the western group of troops, and who to all intents and purposes are being given political asylum. There was also talk of the need for a respectful attitude on the part of the German population to the burials of Soviet servicemen on the country's territory, and to monuments erected at places where they fell in the Great War for the Fatherland.

Bernd Wilz (Christian Democratic union), chairman of the Bundestag Commission for Defense Issues, expressed the opinion that the legislators of the two countries could play an important role in deepening inter-state relations. In view of the complexity of the problems connected with the stationing and withdrawal of Soviet troops, he said, we would like to intensify links between the relevant committees and commissions of the two legislatures and perhaps even create some kind

of interlegislative body. For our part, we intend to do everything possible to ensure that the Soviet servicemen leave Germany with honor and dignity. B. Wilz stressed.

Soviet Official on Obstacles to Troop Withdrawals

LD1501165691 Berlin ADN in German 1531 GMT
15 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Potsdam/Rostock (ADN)—The Soviet troops in Germany are at present transporting only military materiel via the Baltic to Soviet ports. Soldiers are not being transported home by sea. Leonid Sharin, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Supreme Soviet, said in Potsdam on Tuesday. Troops withdrawn from Germany would, according to Sharin, neither be used to put down internal unrest in the Soviet Union nor be stationed in the Gulf if there were a war.

Sharin conceded that there are major problems with the withdrawal. The pace of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia has been so great that there have been great difficulties in the Soviet Union in accommodating Army members, equipment, and families. In addition there are problems with Poland, which will not allow any more military transports than those agreed by treaty to pass over the two available railroad routes. Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Vladimir Grebenyuk, deputy head of the Political Administration of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, added that 30 percent of the Army members, civilian employees, and their families are to be withdrawn from Germany, according to plan and treaty, in 1991.

Brandenburg's Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe, who had previously spoken to the Soviets, said that the land government has been confirmed in its view that the treaty on withdrawal is being observed. [passage omitted]

Last Air Force Regiment Leaves Czechoslovakia

ID2101224691 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT
21 Jan 91

[by TASS correspondent Anatoliy Shapovalov]

[Text] Prague, January 21 (TASS)—The last Soviet Air Force unit, the Tallinn fighter air regiment, today left Czechoslovakia.

Deputies to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, military attaches from various countries and students attended the seeing-off ceremony. They warmly thanked crews of MiG fighters and wished them good luck. Speakers noted that over many years of service in the Czechoslovak air defence, pilots fully implemented their tasks to protect the country.

Central Army Group Commander Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev said 77.2 per cent of all troops have already left Czechoslovakia.

The pullout is being carried out according to the schedule, said M. Kocab, chairman of the Czechoslovak parliament's commission to monitor Soviet troop pullout.

First 93 Tanks Shipped From Germany 21 Jan

LD2201132491 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0841 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Voronenkov]

[Text] Berlin, 22 January (TASS)—On Monday [21 January] the first 93 tanks from units of the Western Group of Forces were loaded aboard the Soviet transport vessel Inzhener Machulskiy, which is in port at Rostock. The loading of a second vessel will start in the next few days. Under an understanding between the USSR and Germany, Soviet military equipment is to be withdrawn in a planned way to the Soviet Union from garrisons of the Western Group of Forces.

Four special areas have been set aside at Rostock port for the dispatch of weaponry and ammunition to the USSR. Specialists reckon that in 1991 military equipment with a total weight of a million tonnes is to be shipped to the USSR through the Baltic ports of the FRG.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Batsanov Comments on Opening of Conference Session

LD2201132191 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT
22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Vitaliy Makarchev and Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva, January 22 (TASS)—A session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference opened here today. Now, after the unification of Germany, it is attended by 39 not 40 nations. They are to discuss almost 20 disarmament problems—from the banning of chemical weapons to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The conference will adhere to new regulations. It will now meet three times not twice every year. This will help make the negotiations more dynamic.

"The Soviet side will press for the elaboration of a global convention to ban all chemical weapons and destroy their stockpiles," head of the Soviet delegation Sergey Batsanov told TASS. "Many technical aspects of this important document are ready. Now it is up to political decisions."

"Equally important is the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and extending confidence-building measures to that domain, too. The current session can be expected to produce new approaches and proposals on

this score. The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the banning of nuclear tests."

"The current session," Batsanov noted, "is beginning in a difficult international situation. The Gulf war cannot help affecting the negotiations. I believe this tense situation should prompt all parties to elaborate new approaches to all problems on the conference's agenda."

NUCLEAR TESTING

Continued Controversy Over Semipalatinsk Operations

Rumor of Shift to Uzbekistan Denied

91WC0038A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 49
Dec 90 p 6

[Article by unnamed SOYUZ correspondent: "On the Basis of Rumors and Authoritatively: The Nuclear Testing Range in Uchkuduk? No"]

[Text] At the time when a national movement for the liquidation of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range has developed, instigators have been found who have persistently begun to name the address of its transfer—Uzbekistan.

And more precisely—the Central Kizil-Kum, the region of the city of Uchkuduk. The same one which became famous thanks to the popular song "Uchkuduk—Three Wells".

The rumors, similar to a wriggling viper, began to crawl through the sands and bakhans [sand hills], apparently, already because this is one of the centers of the extraction of uranium and gold-bearing ores, there are even the suitable mountains of Bukantau which tower over the boundless expanses of the desert. The places here are practically uninhabited, if we do not count the Astrakhan fur-producing brigades and the geological detachments that are roaming through the pastures here.

It is clear, the best method to fight against rumors is glasnost. However, the inhabitants of Uchkuduk did not trust the attempts of the leaders of the Navoiyskiy Mining and Metallurgical Combine, the Bukhara Party Obkom and Oblispolkom to refute the lie that is being obstinately spread by the instigators. There was nothing left for the local authorities to do but to set their hopes on the authoritative opinion of the military. We will note that the latter reacted effectively.

Here is the opinion of Col Gen Ivan Vasilyevich Fuzhenko, the commander of the troops of the Turkestan Military District (and it is located precisely on the territory of Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics) and USSR people's deputy:

"The rumors in regard to the transfer of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range to the Kyzylkum Desert were verified in the general headquarters of the Armed Forces

of the USSR. There is no confirmation of them. The question of transfer has not been raised and will not be raised. I ask for this information to be brought to the population of the republic, to conduct explanatory work aimed at the suppression of the unhealthy rumors, which create uncertainty about the future and are aimed at the aggravation of relations between the army and the people."

A letter with such content was sent, first of all, to the inhabitants of Uchkuduk, at the same time it was published in the district [okrug], oblast, and republic newspapers, and broadcast on radio and television. A timely warning, of course. It is a pity that it was never possible to find out the names of the instigators and to put an end to the rumors already the very beginning.

Discussion in Kazakhstan Rayon Soviet

91WC0038B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 50 Dec 90
p 11

[Article by Seytkazy Matayev, correspondent of SOYUZ: "The Semipalatinsk Testing Range: The Opposition Continues"]

[Text] On the vast territory, where for more than 40 years the USSR Ministry of Defense has wielded power, the deputies of the Abayskiy Rayon Soviet made an encroachment. In their outside session, they discussed the question of the restoration of Abzalinskiy Rayon, which was eliminated in connection with the organization of the nuclear testing range.

In a heated discussion, the question was the triumph of justice, the return of people to the primordial lands from where they were evicted in an hour by the military department. In its turn, the Semipalatinsk Oblast Soviet turned to the republic's parliament to join to the new rayon a number of populated areas of neighboring oblasts that are adjacent to the testing range.

In the republic and local press, on television and radio, a campaign has developed to extend material and financial assistance to the rayon that is being newly formed, everyone is only waiting for the official decision to close the testing range this year. The Supreme Soviet of the republic recently also unequivocally supported these specified dates. In the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the the Kazakh SSR, proclaimed only a month and half ago, concrete steps for ecological protection are stipulated, including the affixing of a point prohibiting the production, storing, and testing of nuclear weapons. For this reason, the people's deputies and their voters have waited from day to day for the decision of Moscow on the termination of nuclear tests. You see, the next moratorium on explosions, declared a year ago, ended on 26 October of this year.

And here an event took place, whose consequences no one can foresee. At one of the last sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, N. Zhotabayev, a people's deputy

from Semipalatinsk, made a deputy query to the government of the republic. He reported that he has at his disposal information to the effect that the president of the USSR, M. S. Gorbachev, signed a decision of the country's Council of Defense concerning the continuation of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk testing range until 1 January 1993. The deputy demanded an explanation from the government concerning this, having simultaneously proposed to the parliament to discuss this question from the positions the adopted Declaration on the Sovereignty of Kazakhstan.

Several days later, the secretariat of the session received an answer, signed by the deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, E. Gukasov. It was published in the republic newspaper SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA and produced the effect of an exploding bomb in the republic. We will cite in full: "During the discussion, in the city of Moscow, of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers 'On Measures Connected with the Conduct of Underground Nuclear Tests,' the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Military-Industrial Questions under the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade V. A. Bukatov, read the decision of the Council of Defense under the USSR president concerning the termination of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk testing range as of January 1993. In so doing, during 1991-1992 it is envisaged to carry out a total of 18 underground nuclear explosions with a capacity of 20 to 30 kilotons." Besides this, it is noted in the response of the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers that there are no official documents in the republic's Council of Ministers concerning this question. It is no coincident that I call attention to the unpredictable consequences of the renewal of nuclear explosions. Let us recall a recent episode at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where passions rose after the testing of a nuclear charge in Novaya Zemlya. Many deputies, as well as the population, were struck not so much by the fact of the explosion itself, as by the fact that no one, including the leaders of Arkhangelsk Oblast, were not notified and not warned about the impending test.

Then, protest meetings about the prohibition of nuclear testing were held in the north of the country. This action was also joined by people of Kazakhstan, who lived thousands of kilometers from the shores of the Arctic Ocean. In human terms, one can understand them: Regardless of where the explosions occur, be it in Novaya Zemlya or in the uninhabited state of Nevada, on the remote Murorua Atoll or the Kovylnaya Steppe near Semipalatinsk, all of this is taken close to heart.

And here the stunning news that nuclear tests will be continued at the Kazakhstan testing range calls forth not only vexation, but also impotence in the face of the expectation of inevitable calamity. Let us turn to the document with which almost every inhabitant of the republic is familiar. We are talking about the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Urgent Measures the Ecological Improvement of the Country" of 27 November 1989 (IZVESTIYA for 4 December). In Point

5 of the decree, signed by M. S. Gorbachev, at that time still the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, there is the paragraph: "The USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry are to examine the question of the termination of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk testing range and to submit a proposal to the USSR Council of Ministers. The USSR Council of Ministers is to confirm the necessary measures in the first quarter of 1990."

Then, in conformity with this, there appeared the decision of the union government concerning the extension of assistance to the population living in the regions adjacent to the testing range, and in it the people of Kazakhstan did not find an answer to the question of when nevertheless the testing range will be closed. Again the interests of the population were ignored. Then again a ray of hope was raised—a moratorium on explosions was introduced. All breathed a sigh of relief: Finally!

But the laws of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry have not been written. These departments do not take into account the interests of the population. People were not taken into account in the 1940's-1960's, when explosions were conducted on the ground and in the air. And they are not taken into account today, in testing weapons of mass destruction underground. But theirrefutable facts of their consequences lie on the surface. The conclusions of the commission created on the instructions of the union government confirmed the growth of the number of cases of leukosis. The number of sick people with such a diagnosis in recent years has doubled. Leukopenia is becoming a characteristic illness. Alarm is called forth by the high infant mortality, the growth in the number of stillborn, various anomalies and manifestations of serious forms of retardedness in children: there has also been a sharp increase in oncological diseases.

I would not want to exaggerate, but the situation around the testing range has been strained to the limit. I think, in answer to the decision about the resumption of explosions, the followers of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" anti-nuclear movement will hold their actions. Perhaps, the Karaganda miners will not remain on the sidelines, who recently at a meeting declared firmly that the day after the first explosion they will go out into the city squares.

Most likely, there can be no question of the restoration, in its former boundaries, of the Abralinskiy Rayon, with which this material began. Among the rural deputies, who believed in glasnost and perestroika, there is reason to lose heart. Their claims against the military departments for their primordial land reminds one more and more of the fight of the fly with the elephant.

In all this history, one circumstance calls forth my bewilderment: But why is it impossible to explain to people from the great platform that the testing range is needed by the country for its security for a certain space of time? Is it really for the sake of a high goal that we do not take this step? You know, we have been deceived for

so long. And now, when they are pulling the wool over our eyes, when they are concealing information from the population, this is doubly offensive.

UN Conference Considers Test Ban Treaty Changes

Perez de Cuellar Remarks Reported

LD0801074491 Moscow TASS in English 0733 GMT
8 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] New York, January 8 (TASS)—A conference to consider amendments to the 1963 treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), began at U.N. Headquarters on Monday.

The conference is taking place at a particularly important moment in mankind's contemporary history, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said in his opening speech.

The world political situation is changing rapidly. The development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and important events in Europe give ground to hope that a new era—an era of peace—is coming, he said.

All this calls for discussion on issues pertaining to the termination of all tests of nuclear weapons, Perez de Cuellar said. He recalled that for many years the United Nations advocated a solution to the problem. It is now essential to make persistent efforts to secure a total nuclear test ban soon, he said.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was elected the chairman of the conference, which will continue for two weeks.

Yevgeniy Golovko, the leader of a Soviet delegation, read out a message of greetings from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to participants at the conference.

In the message, Gorbachev again stated the invariability of the Soviet Union's policy towards a total nuclear test ban as soon as possible as a major step along the way to a nuclear-weapon-free world and reaffirmed the USSR'S readiness to halt its nuclear tests at any time if the United States does the same.

Conference Adds 'Pressure' on U.S.

PM0901094991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Until Recently There Was a Nuclear Explosion in the World Every Nine Days"]

[Text] New York—The main result of the international conference that opened at UN headquarters on Monday

and will run for almost two weeks can be predicted right now: The amendment will not be adopted. It is an amendment to the treaty banning nuclear tests in the three environments, an amendment that would ban all nuclear tests, not just those under water, in space, and in the atmosphere.

The result is easy to predict because the United States is against an all-embracing ban. And Washington, like Moscow and London, has the right to veto any changes that may be made to the treaty signed 27 years ago. The overwhelming majority of countries party to the treaty may support the changes, but if any of the "big three" says "no," that is decisive. That is what Article 2 of the treaty says.

In addition to Washington, London will also say "no." The British Government has already made that clear.

Does this mean that the conference called to discuss the question of transforming the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into an all-embracing test ban treaty is doomed to fail? Yes and no. Yes, because the amendment will be rejected, no because the conference, it seems, will make it possible to step up the political and psychological pressure on the United States. As a commentator in THE WASHINGTON POST put it, the United States will be carpeted by the international community.

The fact that the conference has coincided with the Persian Gulf crisis is objectively helping to step up that pressure. Washington officials have already repeatedly expressed fears that Iraq may be trying to equip itself with nuclear weapons. An all-embracing test ban treaty could undoubtedly allay those fears.

But the "Baghdad factor" clearly does not have for the U.S. Administration the significance that other factors have. The main factor is maintaining the reliability of America's nuclear arsenals. I shall quote a comment from Sunday's NEW YORK TIMES, which I find very remarkable: "A strategic nuclear arms agreement (between the USSR and the United States—A.Sh. note) will cut the superpowers' arsenals by one-third. Even if there were no uncertainties about the course that the Soviet Union will follow in the future, the administration is saying, tests are needed to develop new nuclear armaments and ensure the reliability of the old ones."

The reliability argument is being supported even by those Americans whom we tended to regard as disarmament supporters. A report recently presented to the House Armed Services Committee by Sidney Drell, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and two other scientists, says: Only one-quarter of the arms in the U.S. nuclear arsenals are equipped with chemical detonators of the type which may be less frequently triggered accidentally, in a fire or a plane crash for example, than the old types of detonators. The development of new warheads equipped with safer detonators, S. Drell notes, will require new tests.

I am almost certain that this argument will be heard at the conference in the speeches of the U.S. representatives who will be led by a very low-ranking official. But the fact that a U.S. delegation will attend the conference at all may be regarded as an event in itself because, as THE WASHINGTON POST says, Washington makes no secret of the fact that this conference is an "unfriendly act" toward the United States.

Opening the conference, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar appealed to the participants to "do everything in their power to surmount the difficulties blocking the way to progress in the cause of nuclear disarmament."

In conclusion, here are a few figures. According to UN estimates, there are around 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world today. From 1945 through 1989 there were 1,819 nuclear tests in the world—on average, one test every 9 days. In 1990 the United States conducted eight tests plus one for Britain; the USSR conducted one

The conference will cost almost \$1 million to stage, just counting the costs that will be covered by the UN budget.

U.S. Attitude Criticized

LD0901233191 Moscow TASS in English
1710 GMT 9 Jan 91

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, January 9 (TASS)—An international conference opened at U.N. headquarters today to consider amendments to the treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. It is already clear that most delegations are determined to work towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Few delegations, above all that from the United States, are acting under different instructions.

Five years ago, six member-countries of the Non-Aligned Movement proposed amendments to the 1963 treaty which would turn it into a treaty of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

Political conditions did not appear ripe enough at that time for the proposals to be approved. But the present situation in the world is most favourable for pushing towards the complete ban on tests in all spheres.

The world community has acclaimed the efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals. They have concluded and are implementing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and are now moving towards the conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons and toward the beginning after that of negotiations on battle-field nuclear weapons.

In his greetings to the present conference, President Mikhail Gorbachev pledged the immutability of the Soviet Union's foreign policy aiming at a prompt achievement of a complete ban on nuclear tests as a major step on the road to a nuclear-free world. He

reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to stop nuclear testing as soon as the United States agrees to the similar move. The USSR has also expressed readiness to approve amendments to the 1963 treaty in order to turn restrictions it formulates into a comprehensive ban.

A complete ban on nuclear tests would put up a barrier on the way of proliferation of deadly nuclear weapons, prevent the creation of new generation of nuclear arms and contribute to curtailing the arms race.

It is no secret to anyone that continued tests by the nuclear club members encourage countries which are on the verge of acquiring their own nuclear potential to push on in this direction. A comprehensive ban on tests would lessen the whole world's discontent with the powers which have nuclear arms at their disposal and continue testing ever new nuclear weapons.

In 1995, the countries which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, will have to decide on the prolongation of the treaty for a definite or an indefinite term.

It looks strange in this context that the United States, which has expressed concern over the nuclear weapon proliferation and interest in the long-term prolongation of the treaty, continues to display an irreconcilable approach to a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions.

Gorbachev Greets Conference

PM0901095191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[Message from President Mikhail Gorbachev to Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Conference participants: "To the Participants in the Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Conference"]

[Text] I greet your conference and take advantage of this opportunity to restate the Soviet Union's invariable course toward the earliest achievement of a complete ban on nuclear tests as the most important step toward a world without nuclear weapons. I confirm our readiness to end our nuclear tests at any time if the United States does the same. We are ready to adopt the amendment to the 1963 treaty turning the restrictions contained in it into an all-embracing ban. We urge other countries to support this long-needed solution.

I wish the conference success in its work in the interests of the world community and of peace on earth.

M. Gorbachev

Total Ban Not Adopted

LD1901174191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] A conference of the states that are party to the treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, and under the sea has ended in New York. The conference, which was attended by delegations from more than 100 states, was held in order

to examine an amendment to the treaty, the adoption of which could have prohibited nuclear tests in all areas. The amendment, however, was not adopted. This resulted from its rejection by two powers—the United States and the UK, initial parties to the treaty. Only the Soviet Union, the third initial party, backed this proposal.

A message of greetings sent by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to the participants in the conference was read out at the conference. This message reiterated that the Soviet Union will not change its course, which is directed at achieving the absolute prohibition of nuclear tests as soon as possible, and that this is the most important step on the path toward peace without nuclear weapons. The message also confirmed that the USSR is ready to cease its nuclear tests at any time if the United States does so as well.

Parliamentarians Urge Total Ban on Nuclear Tests

LD0901163491 Moscow TASS in English 1111 GMT
9 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, January 9 (TASS)—The Parliamentarians for Global Action organisation called for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon testing here on Tuesday.

Representatives of this organisation handed over to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar a petition signed by more than 2,000 parliamentarians from more than 40 countries. Iceland's Finance Minister Olafur Grimmson told a news conference in New York. They represent different parties, but are at one in demanding an end to all nuclear tests.

The conference, which is now considering amendments to the nuclear weapon test ban treaty at U.N. headquarters, is a unique international body created mainly as a result of demands by parliamentarians of many countries.

"On the whole, the role played by parliamentarians in today's world is growing," Grimmson said. "I believe that if the present conference fails to achieve practical results, the conference must be made a body which will periodically renew its work to draw the attention of the world community to this vital problem."

"I represent Utah in the U.S. Congress," Congressman Wayne Owens said. "My state neighbours on Nevada and we have felt the grave consequences of nuclear tests conducted there in full measure. Utah residents are suffering from cancer and other grave diseases. An understanding of the need to reconsider the administration's policy in this field is growing both in the Congress and among the broad masses of the population."

Participants in the news conference acclaimed the USSR's stance in support of the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing. Soviet poet Olzhas Suleymenov, representing Soviet parliamentarians in this international organisation, noted that the Soviet Union was ready to sign a treaty on this issue. This approach is shared by the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people, he stressed.

TASS Reports UN Report on Nuclear Test Ban

LD1001091491 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT
10 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov]

[Text] United Nations, January 10 (TASS)—The United Nations on Wednesday issued a report here on the universal prohibition of nuclear tests. The report was compiled by the international foundation, which includes scholars from the United States, the USSR, Germany, France, Canada, China, Sweden and some other countries.

It was timed to coincide with the present U.N. conference examining amendments to the treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

The report contains conclusions by researchers and specialists, working on the improvement of nuclear weapons, on the possibility of signing a treaty on the universal prohibition of nuclear tests by 1995.

Scientists believe that neither American nor Soviet national security would be at risk if one of the countries declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests before 1995. The moratorium could improve the political atmosphere contributing to an agreement on the universal prohibition of nuclear tests, the report says.

However, this conclusion was not backed by all scientists and specialists in nuclear weapons, who have discussed this issue at Soviet-American seminars over the past few years, the report notes.

The report says that there are five main reasons to ban nuclear tests. The ban would slash military spending. Each Soviet nuclear test costs about 20 million roubles, which is enough to pay annual salaries to 10,000 Soviet employees.

U.S. costs, including research, development and the detonation of a nuclear explosion, amount to 160 million dollars. This is enough to provide housing for over 3,000 homeless families, the document notes.

The ban on nuclear tests would end the dangerous rivalry in developing new nuclear weapons. However, it would weaken the stability between the USSR and the United States in the nuclear sphere, requiring additional outlays to prevent such consequences.

An end to nuclear tests would strengthen the legality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime during the critical time until 1995, when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is to be extended, and would limit research in nuclear threshold countries.

In addition, the ban on nuclear explosions would eliminate a source of environmental pollution.

However, some researchers argued against a complete prohibition of nuclear tests, citing the "imaginary need" to develop new nuclear warheads and produce warheads for more reliable nuclear weapons.

They note that nuclear tests are also necessary to check the dependability of existing systems and raise their safety, including their unauthorized use. Tests are also used to check the reliability of nuclear equipment under conditions in which mass destruction weapons could be used.

It is also possible to use nuclear explosions for various engineering projects. Nevertheless, other specialists believe that the above tasks, apart from the first and the last ones, can be accomplished without nuclear explosions.

The report explores both pros and cons and contains numerous technicalities concerning control over the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

The document notes that if the United States and the USSR believe it is possible to fully stop nuclear tests by 1995, appropriate technical preparations should be started now.

Belousov Announces Nuclear Test Moratorium

LD1201163991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1523 GMT 12 Jan 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow, 12 January—The Soviet Union has decided "to implement a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests in the next four months of 1991." This was reported here this evening from the platform of the country's legislature by Igor Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Replying to the question by one of the deputies, he said that a decision on a moratorium had been brought about by the Soviet leadership's striving to find an "acceptable solution" of the socio-economic problems connected with the conducting of tests.

As is known, the carrying out of underground nuclear explosions at Soviet nuclear test ranges is causing anxiety among a proportion of the population of the areas adjoining the test ranges.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Gosplan Head on Cost of CW Elimination

LD0901234791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1640 GMT 9 Jan 91

[Remarks by Gosplan (State Planning Committee) Chairman Yuriy Maslyukov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 9 January; from the "USSR Supreme Soviet Diary" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] I consider it necessary to ask a question, the resolution of which the political prestige of our state depends to a large extent. On 1 June 1990 the USSR president signed the Soviet-U.S. agreement on eliminating chemical weapons [CW]. The cost of fulfilling this is estimated at several billion rubles [R]. We should begin in 1992. The question is: Does the draft budget have a separate mention of this article of expenditure, and in the budget of which department is it included? This question is asked by Deputy Gams, from the committee for questions of ecology and the rational use of resources.

What would I like to say about this? The elimination is scheduled to start beginning 31 December 1992. By 1996 it is necessary to go over to an annual rate of destruction of 1,000 tonnes, not less than 1,000 tonnes of poisonous chemical materials. No later than 31 December 1999, it is necessary to destroy at least half of the stocks and by the year 2002 reduce them to a level of 5,000 tonnes of poisonous chemical materials. What needs to be done to achieve this? First, build three industrial zones for destroying chemical weapons. That is the first thing. I will inform you that to date not one region has agreed to take such an installation; and, with regard to this, so far for 1991 we have envisaged carrying out only design and prospecting work. It is planned to spend R55 million on research, design, and development work in 1991 on this problem, and this is envisaged within the allocations which have been made to the USSR Defense Ministry.

At the same time, considering the fact that the scale of the destruction of chemical weapons is extremely great and requires vast expenditure—about R2.5 to R3 billion, in 1989 prices—it will be necessary for us in 1992 to begin setting up such installations. True, comrades, there are several variants for a more thorough destruction using new physical principles, but they are now in the experimental stage, that is, in the stage of experimental checking. If they prove themselves, then it will be possible to reduce considerably this expenditure and, the most important thing, it will be possible to resolve this problem. [passage omitted]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EDU Suggests Middle East Disarmament Conference

AU2401095391 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG
in German 24 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "EDU Proposes Mideast Disarmament Conference"]

[Text] Vienna—At a one-day meeting of the European Democratic Union [EDU] in Vienna yesterday [23 January], EDU Vice President Jacques Chirac suggested disarmament negotiations in the Middle East according to the example of the Vienna conference on conventional disarmament. In addition, Chirac suggested that the United Nations Organization should limit arms sales to the Middle East. EDU Chairman Foreign Minister Alois Mock said that he would pursue these proposals. The EDU condemned the Soviet military action in the Baltic republics.

DENMARK

Ramifications of CFE Agreement for Army Seen

91EN0173B Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 27 Nov 90 Sec 1 p 4

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Danish Arms Reduction: 36 Tanks Can Be Scrapped"—first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The modest result of the arms reduction talks in Vienna is due to the fact that the Soviet Union feels threatened by the developments in East Europe and demanded changes in the size of war materiel cuts.

The Danish Army will eliminate four tank squadrons, scrapping 36 worn-out Centurion tanks the service has had for 35 years in the process.

That is Denmark's contribution to the so-called Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement on conventional arms reduction that was signed in Paris last week, as Under Secretary Michael Christiansen of the Defense Ministry confirmed.

Contrary to expectations the agreement did not include the dismantling of 10-15 percent of the armed forces' armored personnel carriers, cannons and fighter planes. That is because the Soviet Union, worried about the developments in East Europe, made being allowed to retain a larger number of weapons than originally proposed a condition for signing an agreement at all.

The result was that in the agreement's final form the NATO countries were required to make only minor reductions in the number of tanks and none at all in other types of weapons.

Two Danish Draken fighter squadrons are in line for replacement in the 1990's. The CFE agreement was expected to require the elimination of one of the squadrons, but that was not the case and what will be done with the squadrons now is still uncertain.

"A meeting was planned Friday for the parties to the defense compromise and they would have discussed the Draken squadrons, among other things, but it was cancelled because of the election," Michael Christiansen said.

"The parties were also supposed to discuss the 36 tanks and whatever else came out of the CFE talks. Among other things this means looking at the possibility of reducing preparedness and otherwise making savings in areas directly related to the agreement. But nothing came of this," he said.

Keeping New Materiel

The 36 tanks, which would have required a comprehensive and costly modernization if they were not thrown out, will definitely be scrapped now and similar actions will be taken in the other countries that signed the agreement.

The agreement does not mention the model year or type of the materiel to be discarded. Naturally both sides will keep their modern materiel.

Tanks Cannot Be Recycled

"But what to do with old discarded tanks is still an unsolved problem. Armored steel cannot be cut up and melted down. This is an almost insurmountable problem for the Soviet Union in particular, where 25,000 tanks must be discarded," said Defense Under Secretary Michael Christiansen.

The CFE agreement means that it has been possible to work out an agreement on conventional force reductions for the first time since World War II.

The agreement limits the two defense alliances' arsenals of five selected types of weapons. It covers tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fighter planes and combat helicopters.

"The more long-range goal was to achieve a balance in these systems between NATO and the Warsaw Pact," said Lieutenant Colonel Jorgen Jelstrup of the Defense Command, who added:

"When the talks began it was intended that this balance would occur at a level 10-15 percent below NATO's stockpiles.

Mutual Supervision

"This would have meant that the Danish Army and Air Force would have also been required to limit the number of armored personnel carriers, cannons, anti-tank helicopters and fighter planes.

"In order to reach any kind of agreement, however, it was necessary to grant a number of concessions to the Soviets who claimed among other things that because of the unification of the two Germany states it had lost a substantial part of its frontal terrain and therefore felt less secure.

"The result was an agreement with higher ceilings for individual weapon types. It still involves extensive cuts in the Warsaw Pact stockpiles, while NATO only had to accept tank reductions. As far as the other weapon types are concerned the new ceilings correspond to the existing NATO stockpiles."

As soon as the CFE agreement was signed, the conference participants exchanged comprehensive and detailed information concerning the structure of their armed forces and the geographic location of their arsenals of the five types of weapons involved. After the agreement goes into effect in July 1991 this information will be subject to mutual inspections.

In conclusion Lt. Col. Jorgen Jelstrup stated that "the NATO countries' supply of the five types of weapons would have been the same if the CFE agreement had been signed 15-20 years ago. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has increased its potential drastically in the intervening period and therefore now faces the enormous problem of destroying incredible quantities of military equipment."

FINLAND

Nordic States Urge USSR To Improve Nuclear Test Safety

91WC0042A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 5 Jan 90 p A7

[Unattributed article: "Concern over Moving Tests to Novaya Zemlya Changing Nordics' Nuclear Policy"]

[Text] Finland, together with other Nordic countries, intends to enter into talks with the Soviet Union in an effort to get the latter to adopt in its nuclear testing the same system of safeguards used by the United States.

Accordingly, the Nordic countries are reaching a policy agreement on limiting of harmful emissions from underground tests. The Nordics are thus putting on the back burner their original position, which is that nuclear arms testing should be completely halted.

On Friday [4 January], the [Finnish] Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report containing data on nuclear testing and the limiting of emissions. The report was drafted to serve as a foundation for talks intended to take place among the Nordic countries and between them and the superpowers.

From the report it is seen that the Foreign Ministry has determined that radioactive emissions from nuclear tests

can be virtually eliminated by conducting testing carefully. The report cites as examples of effective systems those used in the United States in tests in the Nevada desert.

According to Foreign Ministry [Disarmament and Security Policy] Section Chief Rene Nyberg, Finland's position is that even the Soviet Union is capable of conducting underground nuclear testing in a safe manner. Nyberg stated that the other Nordic countries have also agreed that the issue of safety must be the main topic of the talks.

This new political line was formulated after it was learned last winter that the Soviet Union intended to move all of its nuclear testing to Novaya Zemlya, some thousand kilometers from Lapland. A formal decision for moving the tests has not been announced, however.

Superpowers Along in the Talks

Nyberg does not regard the new policy line as meaning the surrendering of the stand in principle of trying to ban all nuclear testing, which mainly Sweden has tried to uphold.

Nyberg, however, describes the tactics of attaining this goal as obsolete and talking "hot air", labeling the new method of approach as "non-ideological."

According to Nyberg's account, this new approach was arrived at when it was realized that nuclear tests could be conducted either well or poorly, and that in the United States there is a special scientific subject devoted to limiting nuclear test emissions.

The intention is now to improve safety procedures on Novaya Zemlya in case tests are to be conducted there. In Nyberg's judgement, whether this will be done or not is a matter of superpower politics.

In Nyberg's view, by concentrating on the safety issue, the Nordic countries have reason to hope that the superpowers might also bring in the overall issue of nuclear testing to the talks. The super powers are not going to participate in talks whose purpose is officially announced as arriving at a test ban, stated Nyberg.

On Finland's initiative, the Nordic countries have proposed holding a meeting of international experts at which discussions would take place regarding the limiting of harmful emissions from nuclear testing. According to the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Union has expressed interest in holding such talks. Whether such a meeting would actually occur, however, is still uncertain.

Data Promised from Soviet Union

This Foreign Ministry nuclear test report is part of the effort to prepare for the meeting of experts. The report states that the United States has almost completely succeeded in preventing radioactive emissions in the Nevada testing area since 1971. Safety is based on

precise planning and precautionary measures, as well as on administrative procedures.

The report also states that not much information is known regarding Soviet nuclear testing. Testing systems, how they are arrived at and safety monitoring are all secret.

Finland has asked Soviet authorities for data on these aspects. A start on discussing these issues has been promised to take place in Moscow in early February. Finnish officials will still be visiting Washington for talks on these same issues as late as January.

Also on Finland's initiative, the Nordic countries have likewise requested that an experts group be allowed to acquaint themselves with the Novaya Zemlya test area. The Soviet Union has reacted favorably in principle to this request, but such a visit would take place next summer, at the earliest.

According to the group drafting the report, no foreigners have ever been allowed on Novaya Zemlya. It was only in December that an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union came into affect allowing inspectors from both parties to monitor each others' nuclear tests.

Surface Is Unpredictable

According to the report, 40 underground nuclear tests have been conducted on Novaya Zemlya since 1964. The tests occurred roughly at the rate of two per year, with the most recent one in October. At the main Soviet test site, in Seipalatinsk, located in eastern Kazakhstan, there were around 15 tests conducted in the first half of the 1980s, but only one last year.

Harmful emissions from Novaya Zemlya drifted into the Nordic countries, among other places, in August 1987. The amount of contamination in the air was only around one-thousandth that measured in southern Finland following the accident in Chernobyl in the spring of 1986.

It is stated in the report that Novaya Zemlya's surface can open into fissures as a result of nuclear testing, and that emissions could thus seep into the atmosphere.

According to Geological Study Center Section Chief Reijo Salminen, in this respect, the soil of Novaya Zemlya may be more difficult than that of Nevada.

Winds of Novaya Zemlya are mostly from the west. Only from two to five percent of air currents from the island reach somewhere in the Nordic countries. Activity release in Finnish Lapland would arrive after around two days, so that it would have time to be somewhat weakened.

According to the report, Lapland's food chains would multiply the effects of any fallout. People eating large quantities of reindeer and fish may ingest significant amounts of radioactive cesium.

FRANCE

Greenpeace Asks France To Join Test Ban Talks

BK0601082491 Hong Kong AEP in English 0802 GMT 6 Jan 91

[Text] Sydney, January 6 (AFP)—Greenpeace has sent a letter to French President Francois Mitterrand calling on Paris to join international talks on a nuclear test ban, the environmental group said Sunday.

The letter signed by Greenpeace France President Alain Connan was delivered at 2200 GMT Saturday to the captain of a French warship escorting the Greenpeace yacht Fand near Mururoa Atoll, Greenpeace said in a statement received here from near Mururoa.

Fand has kept a protest vigil off the South Pacific nuclear test site since the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior II left the area in December. Fand's skipper, Australian Chris Robinson, said in the statement that the letter—addressed to Mr Mitterrand—was delivered to military personnel in an inflatable dinghy from the French warship.

The letter was delivered on the eve of a United Nations conference in New York called to discuss a comprehensive test ban treaty. Mr. Robinson said the letter was being sent in solidarity with a large demonstration at the U.S. test site in Nevada, at which 400 people were arrested after entering the site.

Greenpeace noted that France would not be present in New York at the partial test ban amendment conference, nor was Paris a signatory to the two multilateral treaties governing nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons.

The nearly two-week meeting will gather 118 signatories to the 1963 partial test ban treaty, which banned atmospheric testing. Under the treaty a third or more signatories can call an amendment conference.

Mr. Connan said Greenpeace was calling on France to immediately sign the partial test ban treaty and to work for a comprehensive test ban by supporting the New York conference.

Greenpeace further called for an immediate moratorium on testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa, for at least the period necessary for thorough and independent environmental audit of the atolls to take place, Mr. Connan said.

GERMANY

NATO Revising Political, Nuclear Strategies

91GE0109A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Dec 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "NATO Looking for a New Strategy: To Maintain American Leadership Role and 'Minimum Deterrence'"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 December—This week NATO is setting about to answer the questions that result from the changed situation in Europe. This involves not only a new military strategy after the obsolescence of the strategy of "flexible response" but above all the question of what role the alliance will take in the changed Europe and how close the future cooperation will be in the North Atlantic alliance. Will the United States retain the leadership role in the alliance and in Europe? This is the prerequisite for the maintenance of the nuclear protection, especially of Germany, through the Americans. America's role, on the other hand, has a direct effect on the willingness of France to participate in a joint West European security policy and to allow the emergence of a "European pillar" that accepts and supplements the American leadership in the alliance.

This week in Brussels, the NATO defense ministers will deal with these questions and with the striving, on the one hand, to pursue a policy of the outstretched hand toward the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, to maintain a balance of power in Europe. The fall meeting of the defense ministers is the first NATO conference at the ministerial level since the summit meeting that was held in London at the beginning of July. The meeting departs from the usual practice in that it is not a matter of one of the usual conferences as the "Defense Planning Committee" (DPC) that deals only with questions in conventional defense. This time the agenda was extended to nuclear questions. This is in accordance with the need not to rethink the future of the alliance under military aspects but to redefine the political framework of the alliance. Decisions in this connection are not foreseen at this meeting. They are to come at another NATO summit meeting that is to take place the middle of next year.

In the meantime, it is also believed that an agreement has been reached with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. Here it is a matter, in the first place, of coming to an understanding with Moscow on the elimination of all nuclear artillery and all short-range nuclear missiles with a range of up to 500 km. The nuclear missiles of a greater range up to intercontinental systems with a range of more than 5,500 km have already been eliminated through the agreements known in this country as the "double zero option." Secondly, an agreement is being sought with the Soviet Union on a minimum nuclear deterrent. Such an accord, for which Gorbachev at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris announced Soviet proposals within two months, aims not only at a drastic reduction of the remaining nuclear weapons. It would also include a joint understanding on the role of nuclear weapons in the framework of the prevention and control of conflicts and require that both sides ensure mutual transparency for these weapon systems.

That requires not only Soviet willingness but also NATO agreement to a modified nuclear planning. The competent internal bodies of the alliance have been working on this intensively since the summit meeting in London. It is now believed in the alliance that a "reasonable concept

for the substrategic area" can be presented to the ministers as the basis for deliberation. Part of the agreement achieved within the alliance is that there is no longer any justification for the existence of nuclear artillery and short-range nuclear weapons. There is likewise agreement that in the future there will no longer be any role for substrategic weapons in the scope of an unlimited nuclear war. Drastic reductions are now possible.

On the other hand, it is important precisely for Germany that the reassessment of nuclear weapons as the last resort not be interpreted by the United States as meaning that these weapons can be used only after a certain predetermined moment in a conflict, perhaps after a prolonged conventional war in Europe. The German side is stressing that nuclear weapons generally ought to be retained as an element of uncertainty. For this reason, the question of first use remains beyond discussion. A renunciation of this use would diminish the risks for a potential aggressor. With the reduction of the remaining short-range nuclear weapons, the NATO guidelines issued in 1986 for the use of substrategic nuclear weapons lose their importance. The discussion of new guidelines is not yet over. There is hope in NATO, however, that this will be the case by the next NATO summit in May or June of next year. There is no doubt on the German side that they will reject a denuclearization of their own country. Hence the need to make sure that the remaining nuclear component linked with aircraft will be made credible.

It is also seen to be necessary to retain the planned harmonizing of the remaining substrategic weapons with the strategic potential of the United States. Internally there is no opposition to the ascertainment that the retention of the American nuclear component for Europe has the precondition of political consensus and, in time of crisis, the primacy of American policy in the alliance. It is thereby realized that herein lies the crucial obstacle to an understanding with France, which insists on the unrestricted sovereignty of its political and nuclear decisions relative to both America and its European partners. In Brussels this week, France will participate only in the deliberations of the "Independent Planning Group" involving arms projects but not strategic nuclear matters. So, for a discussion of this complex, with the inclusion of France, there remains only the NATO Council, that is, the group of foreign ministers that meets next week in Brussels.

The political consultation of the defense ministers on Thursday and Friday is subdivided. It encompasses the future political strategy of the alliance, including such questions as the maintenance of defensive capability and continuation of arms control negotiations and cooperation with the Soviet Union. It is also concerned with military strategy and its adaptation to the changed political conditions as well as with purely strategic military questions, such as the transition from ready armed forces to those dependent upon a mobilization. This also includes the transition from forward defense to a new operational concept and the renunciation of the chain of

the seven allied corps that for decades has extended from north to south through the FRG. A critical consideration for the reorganization of the military strategy is thereby the desire to formulate the capability of increasing and reducing military forces in such a way that both movements—buildup and reduction of armed forces—can be utilized purposefully as an instrument for crisis management.

Despite the large number of minor questions, the core of the problems is the question of whether a way can be found to harmonize the desire to retain the transatlantic function and the American nuclear protection, with the resulting political consequences, on the one hand, with the desire for a common security policy of the European states, including France, on the other. Also of great importance is the attempt to give a specific structure to cooperation with the Soviet Union, to maintain the balance of forces relative to what is still the greatest military power of the continent, and to do justice to the security interests of the other members of the former Warsaw Pact, while giving consideration to their membership in NATO. That also applies to the discussion of the situation in the Gulf. This is linked with the question of how the FRG wants to balance its interests with those of its allies in the future and what it is prepared to offer them.

Companies Said To Sell Iraq Poison Gas Casings

AU2201105091 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
21 Jan 91 p 17

[Unattributed report: "Iraq Investigations"]

[Text] According to information supplied by U.S. intelligence services, German investigators have opened investigations against two important arms suppliers to Saddam Husayn. Under file number 2 Js 469/90, the Duisburg state prosecutor has opened investigations because of suspected infringement of the arms export law. Businessman Klaus Tellkamp of Muelheim, who has official residences in Nice and in South Africa, is said to have supplied 1,500 210 mm caliber shell casings for poison gas to Iraq. Iraqi arms companies such as the Hutteen State Establishment and the State Organization for Technical Industries also ordered from Tellkamp another 1,500 such casings. However, this deal obviously failed to materialize before and also after the embargo. According to the investigators' information, Tellkamp is said to have used a South African firm in order to cover up the deal with Iraq. The shells were intended for the Al-Fao gun, which Gerald Bull, the artillery genius who was killed in 1990, designed for Saddam Husayn. In a second case the investigators have gotten on the track of an Iraqi arms deal, which after the initial study of 250 files, is of enormous dimensions. For many years the Neu-Isenburg companies Havert Industrie Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Havert Consult Project Engineering and Consulting GmbH carried out transactions worth millions [currency not given] with almost all important arms suppliers. Among other things, Havert is said to

have supplied bomb hangers [Bombenhaenger] for aircraft and control devices [Steuerteile] for the "missile project 1.728" (Scud-B-improvement). Because of alleged violation of the foreign trade law and the arms export law, preliminary investigations have been opened against manager Gerhard Paul and company consultant Hesse-Camozzi. Last week's visit by the investigators was obviously expected. An employee received them by asking why they were coming so late since they had been expected earlier.

Soviet Withdrawal Starts at Port of Rostock

LD2101155891 Berlin ADN in German 1225 GMT
21 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Rostock (ADN)—The complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops agreed with Germany started at Rostock port today. A total of 93 Soviet T-80 battle tanks were loaded into the Soviet roll-on/roll-off freighter "Engineer Makhulski". They had been transported to Rostock from Soviet barracks in the last few days. According to Soviet officers, a second ship to carry more tanks is to follow as early as in two or three days. In addition the Soviet freighter is currently loading tanks (containers) and boiler equipment from Soviet bases.

The withdrawal of all Soviet troops by 1994 as agreed last year between Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is to be carried out mainly through the Baltic Sea ports of Western Pomerania. Starting from now Soviet ships will run a shuttle service between Rostock and Baltic ports carrying tanks, trucks, and other vehicles.

In the meantime four cargo areas in Rostock port have been prepared for the transfer and transshipment of weapons and ammunition. It is expected that about 1 million tonnes of military equipment will be shipped out of the biggest German port on the Baltic Sea in 1991. In accordance with the moratorium agreed with the United States, 1,845 caterpillar vehicles and some 500 military trucks started their journey home aboard ships of the Soviet merchant fleet from Rostock a year ago. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Defense Minister Criticizes Soviet CFE Data

Calls Information 'Misleading'

PM1101171591 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
8 Jan 91 p 4

[Olav Trygve Storvik report: "NATO's Relations With the Soviet Union Are Threatened"]

[Text] Relations between the Soviet Union and NATO could suffer a serious setback if Moscow does not provide a credible explanation of the misleading military information which the country has furnished relating to the disarmament agreement. Defense Minister Johan

Jorgen Holst told Oslo Military Society yesterday evening. The disarmament agreement (the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement) was a central theme of the defense minister's address.

"The Soviet information on military forces is misleading and incomplete and contains systematic mistakes and shortcomings. The Soviet Union has also moved significant amounts of arms and equipment to regions east of the Urals," Holst thundered, although he admitted that the latter is not against the CFE agreement.

"However, it would go against the spirit and aim of the agreement if the equipment that has been moved east of the Urals were attached to active units and kept ready for rapid deployment in Europe. Here we must be given a clarification," Holst said.

"It also looks as if the Soviet Union, contrary to the agreement that has been reached, has anticipated a planned but not yet implemented withdrawal of equipment covered by the agreement. A number of forces and units have not been mentioned. The same applies to many so-called objects of verification."

The Soviet Union has also transferred an airborne division to the KGB, and a motorized infantry division with a full complement of tanks in Arkhangelsk has been rechristened a coastal defense division and transferred to the Navy so that it can be kept out of the restrictions contained in the CFE agreement, the defense minister said.

He also said that Norway has raised these shortcomings and mistakes at the joint consultation group that has been set up in the framework of the agreement, and that it has received widespread support for its objections and questions.

"There are certain indications that the Soviet military has adopted an increasingly tough approach to the implementation of the agreement. This toughening-up could be connected with the role of the military in the conflict over unity in the Soviet Union. But if our questions do not receive satisfactory clarification, this could have repercussions for the ratification of the agreement and represent a serious setback for the new relationship of cooperation between the Soviet Union and NATO," Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst said.

He used much of his address to examine the prospects of a possible future solution to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and to examine what considerations should be taken into account.

"The lessons learned from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] point to a possible route," Holst said. "Confidence-building measures must aim at mutual reassurance, something that requires reductions in armed forces. Such a process must embrace a mutual undertaking to remove all nuclear arms, chemical, and bacteriological weapons and to permit inspection. This is shown by the lessons that have been learned

in Europe, and the short distances in the Middle East make this even more necessary," he said.

"But it goes without saying that there cannot be a viable peace in the Middle East until there is a just settlement for the Palestinians, a settlement which builds on their equal and inalienable right to self-determination," Holst said.

He said that the UN could play a decisive role in the Middle East in the months and years to come and that peacekeeping forces and observers could make a contribution to building up mutual trust. It is not a natural move for Norway to send combat forces to the Gulf, but Holst said that the demand for forces for UN service will increase and that Norway should therefore increase the supply. For this reason the Defense Ministry has set up its own group to look into the question of how Norway can provide support for UN actions.

Notes 'Problems' in Kola Region

PM1401094591 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET
in Norwegian 10 Jan 91 p 10

[Report on interview with Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst by Erik Sagflaet; date, place not given: "Military Strength on the Kola Peninsula Causes Norway Problems"]

[Text] It is not acceptable to Norway that the Russians should reclassify former ground combat troops as naval units and then point out that the navy is not covered by the so-called Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement.

"The text is clear in this area; the agreement covers all equipment deployed in the region, regardless of how it is organized—so on this point we will probably have to fight a few rounds with the Russians," Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Holst pointed out that, leaving this to one side, Norway has to live with the fact that there will be significant military forces on the Kola Peninsula.

"Leaving this to one side, the Soviet Union—or perhaps Russia in the future—will be an important nuclear power. There will be nuclear arms in the northern areas. This will be a strong defense against intruding aircraft and missiles, and the Russians will also have one of their two ocean fleets there. But what we have to arrange is that these forces are organized in such a way that they worry us as little as possible," said Holst, who said that a planned military maneuver involving all of 17,000 men in the Pechenga region does not build confidence.

"We have to make it clear in a way that the Russians understand that so large an exercise so close to our border is not without its problems for us, even though we have been invited to send observers," Holst said.

Holst told ARBEIDERBLADET that Norway has considerable problems with some of the data which the

Soviets have provided in connection with the CFE agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe. This information runs to a thick volume, and Norway has raised several objections.

"These cover, for example, things which the Russians state that they do not have but which we know that they have," said Holst; he was, however, unwilling to go into detail about what is involved here.

"The Soviet side has also anticipated the transfer of materiel and forces out of the area—something which the agreement does not permit," Holst said.

The Soviet Union is moving a good deal of equipment out of the area covered by the agreement to locations east of the Urals.

"This makes for greater security, because advance warning time is longer than when the equipment was in the GDR. But at the same time a great deal depends on whether the equipment east of the Urals will form part of active units which could be deployed in Europe again relatively quickly. We must make sure that the equipment stockpiled outside the zone is not stockpiled in such a way that it could be quickly returned to the zone," Holst said.

"We must be active on the points which affect us. There are significant security dividends for Norway in the CFE agreement—as long, of course, as the Russians do not insist on different interpretations. Then things could look different. But we must take as our point of departure the assumption that the agreement will be observed."

A central aspect of the CFE agreement is also considerable access for inspection. The agreement lays the foundation for openness, including photography, and this represents a major breakthrough.

"This must also have repercussions for secrecy in our own defense forces," Holst said. "In the present situation, for example, I cannot see any reason for keeping the ban on photography at our airports as it is the duty of SAS [Scandinavian Air Services] and Braathens [Norwegian airline] to enforce such."

SWEDEN

Radioactivity After Novaya Zemlya Test

91EN0167A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
23 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by Bard Idas: "Radioactive Leakage"]

[Text] Novaya Zemlya is leaking radioactive gas following nuclear testing. That is the opinion of the Defence Research Institute in Sweden, which registered a small emission of radioactive inert gas. "We are quite certain that the measurement of inert gas Xenon 133 is the result of nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya on 24

October. We have not found other potential sources for the leakage," said Department Director Ingemar Vintersved at the Defense Research Institute in Stockholm. The inert gas was measured during the period between 31 October and 5 November.

"The measurement showed that there were 10 milli-becquerels of Xenon 133 per cubic meter of air. That is very little, and is absolutely not a danger to health. Although the quantity could be larger in northern Norway, I doubt very much that it is enough to be significant," said Ingemar Vintersved.

"This is not the first time that radioactivity has been emitted from a nuclear test in Novaya Zemlya. It happened also in 1987. The leak demonstrates that the Russians aren't in control of the test structure," said Frode Haaland in Bellona.

The National Institute for Radiation Public Health was not, as of last night, informed of the Swedish measurements.

"Xenon 133 is an inert gas and has little significance for radiation public health. I would also be very cautious in ascribing the gas to Novaya Zemlya. Nevertheless, I take note of the fact that inert gas has been measured and I will follow the matter up," said Department Chief Erik A. Westerlund.

SWITZERLAND

State of Nonproliferation Controls Assessed

91WC0031A Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German
8 Nov 90 p 25

[Article by Felix Mueller: "If Only You Knew Who Is Planning Nasty Things..."—first paragraph is WELTWOCHE introduction]

[Text] **Progressive Switzerland?**

Until recently the problems in the arms trade were simple: Should Country A deliver tanks or guns to Country B? However, the Iraqi example has shown that the debate will increasingly revolve around the export of technologies that could be used for military applications. The United States is considering tighter export legislation; the FRG has drastically tightened its regulations. In Switzerland as well there is movement in this direction.

The fact that the Ariane consortium is going to help Brazil build a powerful rocket engine is no longer a surprise to Gary Milhollin, perhaps the best U.S. expert in the field of arms trading: "Under French leadership, the Ariane group has since the mid-1970's repeatedly bought satellite launch contracts at the cost of passing on rocket technology to Third World nations." In this case as well, he presumes that the close cooperation is intended to make it easier for Brazil to use the Ariane for launching satellites in the future and not the Delta rocket produced by McDonnell-Douglas. This trump card is

likely to succeed, since the U.S. company cannot compete with what Europe offers because it would incur penalties for passing on such technologies. The government in Washington has thus drawn the necessary consequences from the fact that Brazil frequently resells know-how with military applications received from Western industrial nations for civilian use. For example, Iraq profited immensely from Brazilian know-how when building its rockets.

To be sure, the Ariane consortium protests that it is convinced of the Brazilians' civilian intentions, and no one can prove the opposite. Is it right, based solely on supposition, to deny a country access to technologies only because they could also be used for military purposes?

The days when one could get agitated about exporting tanks and guns are gone! The proliferation debate of the future will increasingly revolve around the problem of exporting know-how, and nothing could have impressed this realization more strongly upon the consciousness of the politicians and the general public than the Kuwait crisis. Because today—thanks to Western support—Iraq possesses production capacities for means of mass destruction which could turn any war into a bloody undertaking.

All industrial nations participated in the technological armament of Iraq. Although Switzerland—except for fire control equipment—did not directly deliver any weapons, in 1989 alone it delivered machinery worth 189 million Swiss francs, and, based on Saddam Hussein's industrial-political priorities, it must be assumed that the lion's share found application in the armament sector. This is of course a modest sum in comparison with the order volume filled by the German economy in Mesopotamia, and the United States as well supplied this market with high-tech products worth \$1.5 billion over the last five years. Now they are more or less sleeping alone in the bed they made, while most other nations quickly take cover behind the Yankees' broad back but do not exactly stint with good advice as to how the conflict could best be solved.

The value and the composition of the U.S. exports are so precisely known because the U.S. legislation is so strict. Concerning outright arms sales, Congress has the right of codetermination for transactions of \$50 million and up, which guarantees that most of them are made public. Other than that, the United States has a general licensing obligation for exporting high-tech products. As is shown by the Iraqi example, this does not mean that no errors are made, but they are always made knowingly and publicly. Even so, Washington would like to tighten the screw even more: Congress recently passed a law which would use trade sanctions to punish countries or companies that participate in the development of weapons of mass destruction. However, President George Bush is likely to veto this for reasons of politics as well as international law.

Then a few days ago the State Department published a proposal, according to which an export ban would be imposed on all products which in any form could help a country in the secret development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The main part of the new law would be two lists: one list of countries with the names of all the nations which conduct such programs and one product list, which includes everything that in any form facilitates the completion of such plans—PCs, machine tools, chemicals, as well as heavy trucks. U.S. trade and industry protested these plans vigorously. The spokesman for the American Chamber of Commerce declared: "Without international agreements like Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], such measures have no prospects of success."

Painful Case

This supposition is perhaps not incorrect, since outside of Cocom (which primarily regulates West-East trade) export standards do in fact vary greatly. Herbert Wulf of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] states that "France, for example, exports practically everything, whether it involves weapons or know-how." The FRG, on the other hand, has always had very restrictive regulations for exporting actual weapons. "Presumably, that is why German industry specialized in exporting know-how and acted according to the motto: What is not prohibited is permitted." It was the incident of the poison gas factory in Libya which first led Bonn to undertake a course correction. The list of products requiring licenses was greatly expanded, and police control was intensified as well as extended to cover mere brokering. Furthermore, in the future the law will include activity by individual citizens abroad. An engineer employed by an Iraqi firm to work on rocket development will in the future thus also be involved with German justice.

Because of this development, Switzerland has also come under pressure to do something, since the existing regulation avoided the area that is increasingly developing into the central discussion point: The decree of the War Materials Law maintains that the concept of "war materials" covers only objects which "in the same form have no civilian application." Hence, Switzerland permits export of all "dual use" products. Bern realized for the first time how untenable this position was in connection with the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq, since Switzerland as late as 1985 delivered 14 tons of thiodiglycol to Iraq—a substance which is used to produce mustard gas. Saddam Hussein used mustard gas to murder more than 5,000 Kurds. In 1987 the Federal Council, contrary to the wording of the regulation, put eight chemical substances on the index because they could also be used militarily. The list has since been expanded twice and includes 17 new chemicals.

A second case that was embarrassing to Switzerland was made public in 1989. The NEW YORK TIMES revealed that the Krebs engineering firm headquartered in Zurich

had built a chemical plant in Egypt which in fact and truth was a production plant for chemical weapons. The information in the same article that the good Zurich engineers had also accepted a contract to build a pharmaceutical factory in Iran lit a fire under the Federal Council: It beseeched the company to give up that project, which it also did. In this case Bern played the role of supplicant and, absent the legal foundations, had to work with moral persuasion. Rene Pasche, proliferation specialist at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Bern, was of the opinion that "if need be one could still have used Article 102 of the Federal Constitution as a basis—which has already been done in two or three other cases. But that would really have been a stopgap measure."

In order to give the government a more solid legal tool in the future, the administration is at present working on a law which applies to the export of products which could serve to produce chemical or biological weapons as well as rockets. But it is still unclear whether purely intermediary activities or financing actions are to be included. An expansion to include exports of all high-tech products

is not envisaged, however, which puts Switzerland behind the regulations of the United States or the FRG, but compared to other European countries would still leave it in a relatively good position.

A draft of the new law is likely to be the subject of hearings early next year. An uncertain outcome is predicted for it, but the law will only be as effective as the opportunities to monitor it, of course. Until now Switzerland has regularly had U.S. or West German intelligence service sources to thank for such hints and tips. "The Federal Police," a top official in Bern complains, "are totally outnumbered in this area."

And even if the police were coping beautifully with their task, "the problems that occur in this area are considerable from an objective point of view," says Herbert Wulf at SIPRI in Stockholm. "The difficulty consists in early recognition of which countries one can cooperate with in the field of technological exports." In other words, the problem is that humans err: 10 years ago Iraq was held to be worthy of cooperation, and now the West is belatedly trying to put the cork back in the bottle it helped open.

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